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NICHE MARKETS AND THEIR LESSONS*
1. Introduction
Markets are full of nooks and crannies. Out of the glare of the big economies and their pub-
lic exchanges, markets specializing by financial product, activity, or industry thrive, often 
attracting little by way of formal regulatory oversight.1 Industry associations, such as ISDA,2 
or even membership in a particular social group,3 have provided the rules of engagement.
These markets may be primarily domestic, centred in the big economies, but are often inher-
ently international, operating in blissful (or wilful) oblivion to national regulatory strictures. 
These specialized markets are quite resistant to formal regulatory oversight.4 As interde-
pendence of financial markets, products, and participants grows, though, the operation of 
these specialized markets becomes increasingly significant. Until the global financial crisis, 
for example, credit default swaps attracted little attention among the general public and 
* The author would like to thank Sahil Sondhi (Melbourne Law School), in particular, for his assistance 
with this chapter.
1 The specialized weather derivatives market, which allows firms to hedge against variable weather condi-
tions, is one prominent example. Enron was a party to the first weather derivative trade in 1997, and energy 
companies continue to be the biggest users of these instruments. Unmindful of the post-financial crisis regula-
tory imperatives of standardization and exchange-trading, demand for sophisticated, bespoke over-the-counter 
weather derivatives is growing ‘far more quickly’ than in the standardized contract market: ‘Weather deriva-
tives: Come rain or shine’, The Economist (4 February 2012) <http://www.economist.com/node/21546019>. 
A specialized ‘niche’ market is not one that is necessarily systemically trivial: the notional value of the now 
infamously-underregulated global credit default swaps (CDS) market reached US$67 trillion in 2008—more 
than four times the value of its underlying assets: Lynn A Stout, Jean Helwege, Peter J Wallison and Craig 
Pirrong ‘Regulate OTC Derivatives by Deregulating Them’ (2009) 32(3) Regulation 30, 33.
2 ISDA began as the International Swap Dealers Association in 1985 at the time of development of interest 
rate and currency swaps, quite revolutionary financial products at the time but which now appear very simple 
instruments in hindsight. With the burgeoning markets in derivative products of increasing complexity, ISDA 
kept its acronym but changed its name to the International Swaps and Derivatives Association.
3 For example, the Hassidic Jewish community and the diamond merchant trade in New York City, with its 
close ties to diamond markets and merchants in Antwerp.
4 For example, the industry associations for participants in the Euromarket successfully evaded the regula-
tory net of the Investment Services Directive in 1992 by beefing up the industry association rulebooks and 
arguing persuasively for the ‘eurosecurities’ exemption tailored to their particular market. They were not so 
successful the second time around with the Prospectus Directive in 2003. Equally, the swaps markets in the 
United States escaped regulation in the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000. Similarly, a 2008 
report by the English and Scottish Law Commissions determined that the centuries-old concept of ‘insurable 
interest’ was inapplicable to CDS. Instead, the regulation of CDS—which in substance essentially resemble 
insurance contracts—was deemed better left to the marketplace. See English and Scottish Law Commission, 
Insurable Interest, Insurance Contract Law Issues Paper 4, 2008. See also Cally Jordan, ‘The Dangerous Illusion 
of International Financial Standards and the Legacy of the Financial Stability Forum’ (2011) 12 San Diego 
International Law Journal 333, 337–40.
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few people had heard of, much less were concerned with, the way in which LIBOR5 was 
calculated.
But there is another kind of specialized market, one which is geographically and politically 
determined albeit internationally focused. The jurisdictions in which these markets are situ-
ated become known as international financial marketplaces in their own right: Luxembourg, 
Ireland, Dubai, Bahrain, Malaysia, Singapore, Switzerland, among others. These are some of 
the world’s niche markets.
2. Characteristics of Niche Markets
With the exception of Malaysia, which may be the outlier in this group, these niche mar-
kets are all small,6 geographically challenged and independently minded countries which, 
for various geopolitical reasons, have never reaped the economic benefits of expansion and 
empire.7 They have had to be resourceful and self-sufficient, and yet at the same time make 
the most of relationships with a larger hinterland or a former colonial power.
2.1 Advantages in diversity
Niche markets demonstrate linguistic advantages in their diversity, openness to English, 
and in the case of Singapore and Malaysia, proficiency in Chinese. Switzerland has four 
official languages, not including an unofficial fifth, English, and Luxembourg three, again 
with English as an unofficial fourth. Ireland has two official languages, English being 
one of them. Singaporeans are educated in English, but the majority of the population 
is Mandarin-speaking. Equally, Malaysia’s national languages are English, Mandarin, and 
standard Malay. Dubai may only have Arabic as a national language, but English is spoken 
widely due to the large expatriate communities where it is a first or second language.8
Although possibly resource poor, niche markets are people rich, even if some of the peo-
ple have been imported. The diversity of languages, official and otherwise, in these niche 
markets is a proxy for their complexity and adaptability. At the economic and societal level, 
5 LIBOR is a collection of interest rates providing a measure of the cost of borrowing between banks. It is 
based on the rates at which banks lend each other unsecured funds on the London interbank market, and is 
given daily. LIBOR is determined by excluding the highest and lowest 25% of submissions, and then averaging 
the middle of the data. It is considered the most important global benchmark for short-term interest rates. In 
July 2012, regulators revealed that the rate had been manipulated by banks, allowing them to pass on higher 
borrowing costs, welfare losses and general distortions onto customers and the real economy. The manipulators’ 
motives were varied, and included seeking profits on derivatives trades pegged to base rates as well as artificially 
lowering their cost of borrowing to appear less risky during the crisis. See Christopher Alessi and Mohammed 
Aly Sergie, ‘Understanding the Libor Scandal’, Council on Foreign Relations (5 December 2013) <http://www.
cfr.org/united-kingdom/understanding-libor-scandal/p28729#p2>.
6 As of 2013, Malaysia had a population of approximately 30 million people, followed by Switzerland with 
8 million, Singapore with 5 million, Ireland with 4.5 million, Dubai with 2.1 million, and Luxembourg with 
0.5 million.
7 Although, arguably, some may have reaped the benefits of colonization. See eg Niall Ferguson, Empire: How 
Britain Made the Modern World (Penguin Group, 2004).
8 There are an estimated 100,000 British expatriates in Dubai, the largest group among the non-Asian expa-
triates many of whom have English as a second language in addition to Urdu, Hindi, Persian, Bengali, Punjabi, 
Pashto, Malayang, Tamil, etc.
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the local community, as diverse as it may be, provides stability,9 but is also accommodating 
(if not exactly friendly) to the influx of non-locals who serve local purposes. Immigration, 
although temporary in many cases, flourishes, resulting in communities demonstrating a 
functional and almost medieval stratification. Dual, and triple, and more, economies oper-
ate. Education is valued, although not necessarily accessible to all, and technology embraced.
In addition to diversity of language and nationality, niche markets show high tolerance for legal 
pluralism, permitting the co-existence of quite different forms of law and a multiplicity of legal 
systems. The civil law jostles with the common law, international practices and a modern law 
merchant thrive;10 local law and custom persist over centuries, sometimes peeking through colo-
nial overlays. Switzerland excels at comparative law, putting legal concepts from multiple sources 
to work.11 Islam and a very traditional form of imported common law can co-exist in Malaysia. 
A new legal system, providing international services, can be dropped in like a space station (com-
plete with its denizens, the bankers, legal practitioners, and judges), as in Dubai.
Niche markets can also engage in legal free-riding. Ireland and Luxembourg draw heavily 
on the dominant legal systems, common law and civil law, of their larger neighbours. Let 
London and Berlin do the heavy lifting in terms of developing codes and legislative frame-
works, establishing law reform bodies and commissioning reports; the niche markets will 
continue with or appropriate the best of it and direct their energies to areas of specialization 
and value-added. They can focus and innovate.
Nimbleness and opportunism are hallmarks of niche markets. They must innovate or perish. 
Tiny Luxembourg, for example, pioneered the first currency swap in 1981 for The World 
Bank and IBM, paving the way to the new world of derivative products. The Swiss Exchange 
was the first fully automated exchange in the world. The Stockholm exchange, now part of 
Nasdaq OMX, was the first exchange in the world to demutualize in 1993.12 LuxSE had fully 
internationalized clearing and settlement in the 1960s and is still the leading European sup-
plier of post-trading services in some 96 currencies in 54 markets worldwide.
2.2 Niche markets and state capitalism
Niche markets appear in jurisdictions where governments nurture various forms of state 
capitalism. Macroeconomic policy and public funds support the creation of an international 
financial infrastructure in niche markets. The markets may be vibrant and dynamic, some 
if not all of the time, but market forces are subservient to the directing hand of the political 
masters (or, at the least, government and the market are holding hands). Government is the 
market’s friend. The LuxSE notes the ‘close collaboration between government, banks and 
corporations’ in Luxembourg which results in ‘efficient’ decision-making; transactions will 
not be slowed down by bureaucracy.13
9 Bahrain would be a notable recent exception.
10 See Cally Jordan, ‘How International Finance Really Works’ (2013) 7 Law and Financial Markets Review 
256.
11 For example, the Swiss Civil Code is a masterly combination of legal thinking from various sources and 
itself a model for other jurisdictions (such as Turkey).
12 As a point of comparison, the NYSE did not demutualize until 2007.
13 Luxembourg Stock Exchange, ‘The Luxembourg Stock Exchange’ <https://www.bourse.lu/
luxembourg-stock-exchange> accessed 7 September 2013.
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State-owned enterprises in various guises, advertent and accidental,14 dot the financial ser-
vices landscape in niche markets. In a country such as Switzerland, with two,15 but only two, 
major international banks, these banks will not fail. In 2011, as the Swiss franc rose to levels 
threatening the balance and stability of Switzerland’s economy, the Swiss National Bank 
(SNB) capped the currency. Niche market governments intervene. Relatively small local 
populations controlling the political process16 facilitate the nimbleness. Despite sometimes 
large expatriate communities,17 political decision-making resides in local hands. Political 
consensus can be achieved, albeit for different reasons in different places.18
Niche market governments are also international investors in their own right. Many, if not 
all, have sovereign wealth funds of various sorts.19 Singapore has two, Temasek and GIC, the 
portfolio value of the former being some S$215 billion in 2013.20 Malaysia has the Khazanah 
Nasional Berhad. The Investment Corporation of Dubai is a high profile international inves-
tor, sometimes too high profile for its own good.21 Ireland has its National Pensions Reserve 
Fund. Even Switzerland may have a de facto sovereign wealth fund by virtue of the size-
able foreign reserve funds of the Swiss National Bank.22 Tiny Luxembourg has no sovereign 
wealth fund per se, but provides branch office facilities for the others.23
14 During the global financial crisis, governments found themselves in the position of becoming sharehold-
ers in their financial institutions. In some jurisdictions the government will have a ‘golden share’ of some sort 
providing it with a lever to intervene in decision making. Often used in European economies during privatiza-
tions, Singapore and Indonesia, for example, have also created golden shares. On the other hand, it is a point of 
pride that golden shares have not been used in Switzerland.
15 Credit Suisse and UBS.
16 Again, Malaysia, with a population of approximately 30 million, is an outlier here.
17 In Dubai, approximately 17% of the population is local, with the remainder being expatriates.
18 In the case of Ireland, the rising tide of prosperity followed by the bitter consequences of economic fail-
ure, has produced political consensus whereas in Singapore and Dubai it is the result of authoritarian political 
regimes.
19 The IMF defines sovereign wealth fund as: ‘government owned investment funds set up for a variety of 
macroeconomic purposes. They are commonly funded by the transfer of foreign exchange assets that are invested 
long term overseas’. Robert Jenkins, ‘Markets Insight: Swiss example questions need for QE unwinding’, 
Financial Times (29 May 2013) <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d60a55ea-c774-11e2-be27-00144feab7de.
html#axzz2eAm8D1cp> accessed 7 September 2013.
20 Its initial value at its formation in 1974 was S$354 million. Temasek, ‘Portfolio’ <http://www.temasek.
com.sg/portfolio/portfolio_highlights> accessed 7 September 2013.
21 In 2006, the acquisition by one of its tiered subsidiaries of a British company owning significant portions 
of American port facilities was scuppered by American legislators. Although the subsidiary, Dubai Ports World, 
had complied with the appropriate processes and regulatory requirements, the House of Representatives cited 
national security concerns in voting to block the deal. Twenty-four hours after the vote, the firm decided to 
sell off its American port holdings. See Kevin W Lu, Gero Verheyen, and Srilal Mohan Perera, Investing with 
Confidence: Understanding Political Risk Management in the 21st Century (World Bank Publications, 2009), 75.
22 Jenkins (n 19): ‘Viewed as FX reserves, the SNB ranks fifth in the world. Viewed as a sovereign wealth 
fund, the holdings approximate those of China Investment Corporation. The Financial Times’ front page 
recently reported Beijing’s search for a new head of that wealth fund. Will a future edition announce the search 
for a chief investment officer of a newly created Swiss SWF?’, Financial Times (29 May 2013).
23 Indeed, it is marketed as the ‘domicile of choice for the international investment structures of a number of 
sovereign wealth funds’ (Ernst and Young, ‘Luxembourg—the gateway for Islamic finance and the Middle East’ 
(February 2013)  <http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Luxembourg_the_gateway_for_Islamic_
finance_and_the_Middle_East/$FILE/Luxembourg-the-gateway-for-Islamic-finance-and-the-Middle-East.
pdf>, 4, accessed 15 January 2014. Luxembourg may host sovereign wealth funds, but does not have one itself.
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2.3 Niche markets and exchanges
Exchanges are the public face of niche markets; all the niche markets have them, sometimes 
several. The exchanges have been on the front line of the adaptive process.24 Technology has 
been friendly to niche markets in this respect, creating new opportunities and overcoming, 
at least to a certain extent, isolation and the tyranny of distance.
Niche market exchanges have targeted, or been created to serve, international markets; for 
the most part, their domestic markets are too small to sustain them.25 The LuxSE, founded 
in 1928, is ‘resolutely international in outlook’,26 calling itself the ‘European exchange for 
international securities’. LuxSE hosts issuers from more than 100 countries.27 The SIX 
Swiss Exchange advertizes itself as an ‘internationally oriented and potent capital market’, 
one which is ‘more than a trading venue. Our appeal extends far beyond the borders of 
Switzerland’.28 Singapore is the ‘Gateway to Asia’. Dubai has created its own international 
exchange, ‘Nasdaq Dubai’, recycling the wealth that is awash in the Gulf region. Malaysia 
has positioned itself as the leading jurisdiction for Islamic finance, which potentially appeals 
to over a billion adherents around the world.
In terms of financial products, issuers and investors, the niche market exchanges have adopted 
different strategies. The LuxSE has specialized in Eurobonds and Malaysia in Islamic finan-
cial products. Dubai has created an exchange with ambitions of international reach, recyling 
wealth from the Gulf region. Ireland has the LuxSE and Luxembourg’s fund management 
business in its sights. The SIX Swiss Exchange, on the other hand, is a full service exchange, 
trading the whole gamut of financial products, either directly or through its subsidiaries 
and joint ventures; it is an independent ‘reference market’ for ‘over 40,000 Swiss securi-
ties’. 29 The self-identified selling points of SIX Swiss Exchange are its depth (liquidity) and 
multi-asset platforms. SIX Swiss Exchange is also known, perhaps somewhat controversially, 
as a friendly place for high frequency trading.30 Trading occurs on the SIX Swiss Exchange 
‘in a blink’, with thousands of orders per blink.31
Some niche market exchanges have not been swept up in the current waves of exchange 
mergers and consolidations.32 Luxembourg had no interest in joining Euronext when it was 
24 Malaysia being the exception to this.
25 Again, Malaysia may be the outlier here, but given that it is a developing economy, population size alone 
may not be sufficient to sustain a vibrant domestic market.
26 Bourse de Luxembourg, ‘A guide to 50 years of Eurobonds in Luxembourg’ (12 May 2013), 11.
27 ‘Bourse de Luxembourg’ <https://www.bourse.lu/home> accessed 16 January 2014.
28 SIX Swiss Exchange, ‘Welcome at SIX Swiss Exchange’ <http://www.six-swiss-exchange.com/profile/
profil_en.html> accessed 7 September 2013.
29 SIX Swiss Exchange (n 28).
30 SIX Swiss Exchange sometimes plays down its attractiveness to high frequency traders.
31 SIX Swiss Exchange, ‘10,000 orders in 1 blink—on the world’s fastest exchange’ <http://www.
six-swiss-exchange.com/news/overview_en.html?id=inet_colo> accessed 15 January 2014.
32 Singapore failed in its attempt to merge with (or takeover, in the eyes of some Australian commenta-
tors) the Sydney exchange, the ASX. The Australian government refused to approve the transaction, dealing 
Singapore the ‘national interest’ card; Singapore had to fold its hand. The Australian Treasurer made his deci-
sion to block the merger and described it as a ‘no-brainer’: ‘How the ASX-SGX merger failed’, Sydney Morning 
Herald (21 April 2011) <http://www.smh.com.au/business/how-the-asxsgx-merger-failed-20110421-1dqb2.
html> accessed 7 September 2013, saying that ASX ‘operates infrastructure that is critically important for the 
orderly and stable operation of Australia’s capital markets’: Chris V Nicholson ‘Australia Rejects Exchange 
Deal’, The New York Times (8 April 2011) especially since it is the country’s primary equities and derivatives 
exchange, as well as its sole clearing house for equities, derivatives, and bonds. He said that ‘not having full 
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formed as a consolidation of the Paris, Brussels, Amsterdam bourses in 2000; this would sim-
ply have diluted its brand.33 SIX Swiss Exchange (formerly SWX) in Zurich and Deutsche 
Bőrse in Frankfurt are very friendly, but no formal merger of the two exchanges is contem-
plated.34 SIX Swiss Exchange advertizes itself as ‘the most important independent exchange 
in Europe’ (emphasis added).35 Other niche market exchanges have looked to consolida-
tions and mergers to survive and reposition themselves in a highly competitive exchange 
environment. Singapore took a run at Sydney. Bahrain’s exchanges (as there are several, in a 
tiny country) are likely on the hunt for regional partners. Dubai’s experiment in creating an 
international financial centre and an exchange to match, has been fraught; unable to survive 
on its own, the DIFX was annexed by NASDAQ and there may be further consolidation on 
the way.
Even without formal consolidations however, under the surface, alliances and interconnec-
tions exist. Until 1 January 2012, the SIX Swiss Exchange and the Deutsche Bőrse Group 
each held 50 per cent of EUREX, the world’s largest futures and derivatives exchange. They 
are also partners in a new joint venture, ‘Scoach’, to provide a trading platform for derivatives 
products.36 SIX Swiss Exchange boasts that its trading platform for equities is the fastest in 
the world;37 it was developed by the US-Baltic exchange, NASDAQ OMX.38 Although not 
formally a part of Euronext, in 2009 Luxembourg entered into a partnership with a Euronext 
subsidiary to develop trading platforms.39 The Irish Stock Exchange (ISE) has an alliance 
regulatory sovereignty over the ASX-SGX holding company would present material risks and supervisory issues 
impacting on the effective regulation of the ASX’s operations, particularly its clearing and settlement functions’: 
Nicholson (n 32). Some sources suggested, however, that one of the Australian Treasurer’s primary concerns was 
the indirect 23% non-voting stake in SGX held by the Singapore government, although this was never stated 
publicly. See ‘How the ASX-SGX merger failed’, Brisbane Times (11 April 2011).
33 LuxSE CEO has said that the exchange wishes to remain independent because, ‘[m] ergers between 
exchanges will not always bring more efficiency. An exchange facilitates capital formation and this comes from 
the ground up—from small and medium-sized enterprises—and the best interests of these companies may not 
always be served in a mega-merger. We believe that we can deliver better as an independent exchange’: Bourse 
de Luxembourg (n 26), 12.
34 Amongst other arrangements, on 25 October 2006, Deutsche Börse AG and SIX Group AG agreed in a 
cooperation agreement to combine their business operations in the area of structured products in a European 
exchange organization under a joint name and trademark (Scoach). This cooperation agreement was adopted 
by SIX Swiss Exchange AG in place of SIX Group AG on 24 March 2009: Deutsche Borse Group, ‘Annual 
Report 2010’ <http://deutsche-boerse.com/dbg/dispatch/en/binary/gdb_content_pool/imported_files/pub-
lic_files/10_downloads/12_db_annual_reports/2010/10_complete_version/Annual_Report_2010.pdf> 
accessed 7 September 2013. However, the partnership unravelled in 2013, and SIX Swiss Exchange now oper-
ates the SIX Structured Products Exchange, formerly known as Scoach Switzerland.
35 SIX Swiss Exchange, ‘Regulation of short selling as part of self-regulation’, Media Release (10 October 2013), 
2, emphasis added <http://www.six-group.com/dam/about/downloads/media/media-releases/2013/1010-e-
Short-Selling.pdf>.
36 A response to crisis driven calls to improve transparency and security by moving derivatives trading to 
exchanges: SIX Swiss Exchange, ‘Scoach: Five Eventful Years’ <http://www.six-group.com/about/en/shared/
news/2012/scoach.html> accessed 7 September 2013. DB, having acquired SIX Swiss Exchange’s 50% share, 
is now the sole owner of Eurex. See Eurex, ‘Corporate Structure’ <http://www.eurexchange.com/exchange-en/
about-us/corporate-overview/organizational-structure/139878/> accessed 7 September 2013.
37 Matching trades in 37 microseconds: SIX Swiss Exchange, ‘From 800 to 37 Microseconds’ <http://
www.six-group.com/about/en/shared/news/2012/from-800-to-37-microseconds.html> accessed on 7 
September 2013.
38 The second largest US equities exchange, itself a consolidated international exchange, OMX being a 
consolidation of Nordic exchanges.
39 The Luxembourg Stock Exchange, ‘NYSE Euronext Cooperation’ <https://www.bourse.lu/luxembourg-s
tock-exchange-nyse-euronext> accessed 7 September 2013.
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with the Deutsche Bőrse for trading ISE’s equities on the German exchange’s Xetra trading 
platform. Obviously, compatibility of electronic trading platforms permits cooperation and 
integration of operations across exchanges, irrespective of physical location or the formali-
ties (and political bother) associated with merger or consolidation. One of the selling points 
for the (failed) merger of Singapore’s SGX and Sydney’s ASX was the compatibility of their 
trading platforms, provided by Nasdaq OMX.
Electronic trading is eclipsing traditional exchanges the world over, leaving the exchanges 
scrambling to find new relevancy, new product and service lines and new fee generation 
opportunities. Niche market exchanges have been at the forefront of these developments, 
given their proclivity for innovation and adaptability,40 as well as their scramble to survive in 
some cases. SIX Swiss Exchange has an integrated vertical silo providing, through subsidiar-
ies, the lucrative ancillary services of clearing and settlement, custody, share registry, pay-
ment systems, etc. LuxSE boasts that it has listed the first sukuk in Europe as well as the first 
French dim sum bond,41 in addition to being the leading European supplier of post-trading 
services. LuxSE can settle in 53 currencies in 70 countries around the world.42
2.4 Problems associated with niche markets
It is not hard to imagine the problems associated with niche markets. They can be vulner-
able to change, as well as profiting from it. One misstep, one hesitation to adapt, and the 
combination of their small size and possible overspecialization can lead to near extinction.43 
Generalized market malaise may manifest itself in an acute form in niche markets. Niche 
markets tend to prize their reputations, yet small places are susceptible to cronyism and cor-
ruption, as Ireland has recently demonstrated.44
Niche markets are fiercely competitive, but competitive pressures may also drive such 
markets under.45 Their tax friendly environments may be attacked by the big economies 
intent on capturing tax revenues.46 The tailored regulation and attentiveness to specialized 
40 For example, the SIX Swiss Exchange’s high-frequency trading services (see n 37) or the former Scoach’s 
platform for securitized OTC derivatives: SIX Swiss Exchange, ‘SIX Swiss Exchange message no 17/2013’ 
(15 March 2013) <http://www.six-swiss-exchange.com/swx_messages/online/swx_message_201305151012_
en.pdf> accessed 15 January 2014.
41 The first sukuk on a European exchange, issued by Malaysia Global Sukuk Inc (which is wholly owned 
by the Malaysian Ministry of Finance) and the first French dim sum bond were issued on 23 August 2002 
and 19 September 2011, respectively. See Luxembourge Stock Exchange, ‘History’ <https://www.bourse.lu/
luxembourg-stock-exchange-history> accessed 7 September 2013.
42 PwC, ‘The Luxembourg Stock Exchange—A prime location for Sukuk Listing’ (2013), 2; Association 
of the Luxembourg Fund Industry, ‘UCITS’ (17 July 2013) <http://www.alfi.lu/setting-luxembourg/ucits> 
accessed 23 December 2013.
43 Iceland is a prime example, as is Ireland. Dubai has also struggled in recent years, with a property bubble 
and potential collapse of Dubai World.
44 Ireland, again, suffered the humiliation of a banking scandal as it was pulling out of its global financial 
crisis quagmire. In July 2012, three former Anglo Irish Bank executives were charged with unlawfully aiding a 
group of investors in buying its shares in 2008, thereby falsely inflating its share price before nationalization. 
Its CEO, Sean Fitzpatrick, was well known for his political connections, famously playing a round of golf with 
Ireland’s then prime minister Brian Cowen a few months prior to the nationalization. See Linda Saigol and 
Jamie Smyth, ‘The men behind the Anglo Irish Scandal’, Financial Times (London and Dublin, 25 June 2013).
45 Singapore and Ireland are two markets which are struggling.
46 The tax friendliness of Ireland has been a political football in the United States for Google, for example.
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market demands may spark allegations of ‘race to the bottom’ tactics.47 Niche markets 
may create opportunities for regulatory arbitrage, frowned upon by other regulatory 
authorities.48
3. Distinctive Features of the Niche Markets
3.1 European niche markets—Luxembourg, Switzerland, and Ireland
Luxembourg and Switzerland, each for different reasons, are long-established international 
financial centres.49 Each is centrally located within Europe, and giving the lie to the law and 
finance literature,50 each is firmly within the European civil law tradition. Luxembourg, a 
country of barely half a million people, benefits from membership in the larger world of 
the European Union and, as a founding member, is home to EU institutions, the European 
Court of Justice and the European Investment Bank.51 See Figure 9.1 (source: Bourse de 
Luxembourg (n 26), 4).
Switzerland, too, benefits from the European Union, albeit in a different way: it is not an 
EU member state, and so not constrained by the EU agenda set in Brussels. It is a careful line 
which the SIX Swiss Exchange treads, in affirming its commitment to harmonization with 
its EU neighbours, yet exploiting its differences as a competitive advantage.52 Switzerland’s 
prized neutrality has made it the home, not to EU institutions, but to international ones.53
Ireland is a latecomer to the European niche markets club, and one with a more troubled 
recent past. Still, having missed the first mover advantage captured by Luxembourg in the 
collective investment fund sector, Ireland has made a dramatic comeback and is now the 
world’s fastest growing domicile for this market.
Tax incentives in all three countries, as in other international financial centres, act as a money 
magnet, attracting wealth generating industries and their service providers. A high level of 
creature comforts and good living assist. Luxembourg, Switzerland, and Ireland all provide 
an accommodating environment to high income asset managers and the clients they serve.
3.1.1 Switzerland
One of Switzerland’s advantages, and one not shared by many niche markets, is its balanced 
economy, combining manufacturing and services. It has, of course, adroitly exploited its 
47 Chris Newlands, ‘ “Lax” Luxembourg defends regulatory regime’, Financial Times (26 May 2013) <http://
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e0a51ce4-c47f-11e2-9ac0-00144feab7de.html#axzz2eAm8D1cp> accessed 7 
September 2013.
48 The mandate of the new European Securities and Markets authority specifically refers to deterring 
regulatory arbitrage (ESMA, ‘ESMA in Short’ <http://www.esma.europa.eu/page/esma-short> accessed 7 
September 2013).
49 Switzerland is the largest, with a population of nearly 9 million people to Luxembourg’s 0.5 million.
50 Which posits that common law systems produce more highly developed financial markets. See Rafael 
La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W Vishny, ‘Law and Finance’ (1998) 106 
Journal of Political Economy 1113.
51 The European Investment Bank is the leading issuer listing on the Luxembourg exchange. See Figure 9.1.
52 SIX Swiss Exchange openly avows its interest in harmonization.
53 A large number of international organizations have based themselves in Switzerland, including a plethora 
of UN agencies and, most significantly, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision as well as the more 
recently created Financial Stability Board.
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political neutrality and, over decades, burnished its reputation for financial impeccability 
and discretion, a task which has lately proved challenging. Switzerland definitely looks 
outward to the larger international world, but maintains its domestic centre of gravity. 
Bern is the domestic exchange for Switzerland, whereas SIX Swiss Exchange is the inter-
national venue. Unlike LuxSE, which has pursued a successful strategy of specialization, 
SIX Swiss Exchange is a full service exchange, touting its depth, liquidity, and interna-
tional outlook. Switzerland has the resources to indulge in the latest technology and has 
attracted high frequency trading for that reason. But Switzerland treads another fine line 
here. Providing opportunities for regulatory arbitrage with the European Union, mobiliz-
ing technology to attract trading, highlighting its attractive tax regime, all are tempting 
competitive strategies for Switzerland. The United Kingdom tightens its taxation of high 
income expatriates, and investment bankers pack their bags for Geneva and Zug. Publicly, 
though, these possibilities are downplayed. For the Swiss, reputation is all, a lesson which 
has not been lost on other niche markets.
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Figure 9.1 Top 20 Issuers by Outstanding Issue Amount in Luxembourg
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3.1.2 Luxembourg and Ireland—the great rivalry
Tiny Luxembourg is home to one of the world’s major capital markets, with the LuxSE 
as the leading European exchange for international bond listing with a market share of 
42.1%,54 and operating in 53 currencies.55 Also, Luxembourg is a leader in cross-border 
investment fund activity, the world’s second largest investment fund centre after the United 
States and the world’s largest distribution centre for such funds.56 The LuxSE is home to 
almost 4,000 collective investment funds, known as UCIs (Undertakings for Collective 
Investments), collectively managing €2.6 trillion.57 Luxembourg’s UCI industry is home to 
three-quarters of UCI funds distributed internationally and serves 70 countries.58
The global investment fund industry has traditionally grappled with a complex and frag-
mented regulatory environment.59 While the UCITS regime was originally intended to serve 
the European Union as a single market, it has become the only true global standard in 
cross-border funds.60 An increasing number of asset managers are establishing UCITS funds 
with a strategy for global distribution and Luxembourg is at the forefront of these trends. 
Luxembourg has been intimately involved in the growth of UCITS as a global brand and 
owes much of its success as a financial centre to this initiative. Luxembourg benefited from 
a first mover advantage as the first market to launch a UCITS fund in 1988.61 Luxembourg 
was also the first country to implement the UCITS Directive into national law.62 Moreover, 
there have been relatively frequent and substantial revisions to the UCITS vehicle and 
Luxembourg has stayed at the forefront, both by contributing to these changes and by imple-
menting them quickly and efficiently.63 Today, the country’s UCITS funds alone represent 
31.2 per cent of European UCI assets,64 and three-quarters of all UCITS funds distributed 
internationally.65
The international funds business is the niche Ireland has targeted. The Luxembourg industry 
association takes pains to downplay the rivalry by saying that Luxembourg’s strategy is not 
aimed at competing with Ireland. In particular, given that currently the unregulated alterna-
tive investment funds business must transition to a regulated industry under the Alternative 
Investment Fund Management Directive (AIFMD) in the European Union, Luxembourg 
argues that enough new business will be generated for both countries to share.66 One factor 
is that AIFMD will force foreign fund houses to establish offices in Europe as it will be easier 
to comply with the regime from closer proxmity.67
54 PwC, ‘The Luxembourg Stock Exchange—A prime location for listing’ (2012), 3.
55 PwC (n 54), 2.
56 Association of the Luxembourg Fund Industry, ‘Luxembourg: The Global Fund Centre’ (2012–13), 
3  <http://www.alfi.lu/sites/alfi.lu/files/Luxembourg-the-global-fund-centre.pdf> accessed 15 January 
2014.
57 Ernst & Young, ‘Investment Funds in Luxembourg—A technical guide’ (September 2013), 5.
58 Association of the Luxembourg Fund Industry (n 42).
59 ‘Investment Funds in Luxembourg’ (n 57), 8.
60 Spence Johnson, ‘Trends in Cross Border Distribution’ (September 2012), 6.
61 Johnson (n 60), 6.
62 Association of the Luxembourg Fund Industry (n 56) 11.
63 Association of the Luxembourg Fund Industry (n 56), 13.
64 Association of the Luxembourg Fund Industry, ‘An Overview of the Luxembourg Fund Industry’, 
PowerPoint Presentation (2012), 2.
65 Association of the Luxembourg Fund Industry (n 56), 2, 11.
66 Ellen Kelleher, ‘Luxembourg could strike fund gold again’, Financial Times (3 February 2013).
67 Kelleher (n 66).
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Compared to Luxembourg and Switzerland, Ireland is an upstart as an international finan-
cial centre. Despite Luxembourg’s first mover advantage on UCITS, Ireland was quick off 
the mark. As a result, between 2000 and 2010 total fund assets domiciled in Ireland grew 
at an average annual rate of 17 per cent compared with Luxembourg’s 10 per cent.68 Today, 
Dublin is the world’s largest administration centre for hedge fund and alternative managers, 
with more than 40 per cent of global hedge fund assets being serviced there.69 And Ireland 
continues to be the fastest growing UCITS domicile in the world.70
In fact, Ireland has been so successful in establishing itself in the financial services industry, 
that it has proven a stabilizing force during turbulent economic times for Ireland. The Irish 
markets experienced serious and well-publicized difficulties. In part, Ireland was touched 
by the generalized instability and uncertainty of the Eurozone debt as well as economic dif-
ficulties of its own making. But financial services have continued to shine. ‘Ireland has been 
through a very tough period in the past few years; we have grounds to be optimistic now on a 
number of fronts but in financial services the one constant has been the funds industry. The 
industry continues to create employment, to showcase our talents and to enhance Ireland’s 
reputation as a place to do business.’71
Unlike the United Kingdom, Ireland enthusiastically embraced the European Union, and 
has profited mightily by the relationship. Despite Ireland’s choice of investment funds 
management as its niche putting it on a collision course with Luxembourg, Ireland was 
remarkably successful in a short period in positioning itself as a fund destination. It created 
a developed fund infrastructure, enticing participants with low taxes. For example, Ireland’s 
capital gains tax rate fell from 60 per cent in 1985 to 20 per cent in 2001 and its corporate 
tax rate fell from 50 per cent to 16 per cent in the same years.72
The MiFID structure for financial services provided Irish funds with easy access to the rest 
of Europe. However, the crucial EU instruments for Irish purposes have been the UCITS 
Directives which created a European passport for certain types of securities. Ireland imple-
mented the UCITS Directive early on and has paid close attention to its updating. Finally, 
Ireland invested in its people, turning an educated and English-speaking population into 
legions of professionals such as accountants, listing brokers, and lawyers, all of whom form 
the infrastructure of a financial niche.73 The result was that funds flocked to set up shop in 
Ireland; as of 2013, over 12,000 funds are domiciled in Ireland.74
Implementing EU directives is one thing; maintaining the regulatory domestic underpin-
nings is another. EU directives float on top of the domestic legal system, exerting their 
68 Marie Lindsay, ‘Luxembourg and Ireland remain competitive jurisdictions for UCITS hedge funds’, 
Hedge Funds Review (30 September 2011).
69 David Ricketts, ‘Luxembourg’s bid for the alternatives’, Financial Times (2 May 2010).
70 Matheson, ‘Ireland and Luxembourg—a comparison’ (30 April 2013)  <http://www.matheson.com/
images/uploads/publications/Ireland_and_Luxembourg_WEB_May_13.pdf> accessed 15 January 2014.
71 Mr Michael Noonan, Irish Minister for Finance, 12 June 2013 <http://www.irishfunds.ie/fs/doc/publi-
cations/ifia-presentation-tokyo-english.pdf> accessed 23 December 2013.
72 Marc C Duff, ‘Ireland’s Economic Progress: on the verge of bankruptcy to economic star of Europe 
in 5 years’ (October 2003), Tax Payers Network, <http://www.taxpayersnetwork.org/_Rainbow/Documents/
Irelands%20Economic%20Progress.pdf> accessed 23 December 2013.
73 Irish Funds Industry Association, ‘Why Ireland?’ <http://www.irishfunds.ie/why-ireland/> accessed 23 
December 2013.
74 Irish Funds Industry Association (n 73) .
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harmonizing influences. Ireland, like the United Kingdom and unlike the rest of the 
European Union, is a common law jurisdiction. For historical and other pragmatic reasons, 
Irish legislation and institutions very much follow the UK lead. Of late, the United Kingdom 
has been undergoing great regulatory and institutional change in financial services. Repeated 
reglatory and institutional overhauls are costly, and potentially disastrous, even in large mar-
kets such as the United Kingdom.75 They are particularly worrisome in small markets such 
as Ireland, where resources are fewer and the financial system less resilient. In the case of 
Ireland, it has been the price to pay for dancing to the United Kingdom’s legislative and 
regulatory tune.
3.2 Singapore and Malaysia
The modern city state of Singapore was born in 1965 when Malaysia and Singapore parted 
company after a shortlived relationship. The Chinese population, a minority in Malaysia as 
a whole, formed a majority in the new Singapore. The shared colonial history of Singapore 
and Malaysia, however, has left behind the legacy of the common law. Although both coun-
tries have followed different paths in the ensuing years, both have been able to look to 
London (although not exclusively to London) to continue to provide the conceptual bases 
of their financial and legal systems. Within that context, they have forged their own way. 
A strong form of British colonial law and institutions has persisted in Malaysia, adapted by 
and adapting to, its Islamic majority population.76 English law and institutions are also still 
readily discernible in Singapore, but much influenced by uniquely Singaporean initiatives 
and idiosyncrasies. Unlike Malaysia, Singapore is more interested in China77 and Hong 
Kong, rather than Islam.
3.2.1. Malaysia
Malaysia is somewhat of an outlier in this discussion of niche markets. It has a relatively large 
population of 28 million people and a fairly diversified, resource rich economy including a 
vibrant oil and natural gas industry. Additionally, Malaysia, unlike some of the other niche 
markets under consideration, would still be considered an emerging economy, although 
this concept itself is somewhat outdated. Malaysia’s particular niche, Islamic finance, also 
fits somewhat uneasily in the ‘niche’ category; it is geographically widespread and growing 
rapidly in importance.
Nevertheless, Malaysia has adopted, and further developed, niche market strategies. It has 
recognized the potential which internationalization presents for its domestic economy. The 
Malaysians are not shy about state capitalism either and the government is an active initia-
tor of economic activity. There is a special offshore financial centre with its own regulator, 
75 There were concerns that the regulatory overhauls of the 2008–13 period in London in response to the 
global financial crises would sow disarray in the markets and permit serious regulatory lapses. However, the 
dismemberment of the Financial Services Authority into two regulatory bodies, the FCA and the PRA, pro-
ceeded fairly smoothly once the direction of regulatory reform had been settled. The cynical might say that was 
because not much changed, with the FCA picking up, albeit with a more limited jurisdiction, where the FSA left 
off. Personnel stayed in their offices, the email address may have changed from ‘FSA’ to ‘FCA’, but otherwise, 
everyone carried on.
76 The process of British colonization usually did not displace local law and custom; the English common 
law, as introduced, floated on top of it.
77 Because it is such a direct comparator and traditional rival.
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LOFSA, the Labuan Offshore Financial Services Authority. As in other niche markets, 
Malaysia has created specialized market segments and parallel regulation, similar in general 
structure, differentiated at the margins, interlinked and generally compatible. Keeping a 
keen eye on international developments in capital markets, Malaysia has been an early adop-
ter of international financial standards and has assumed a leading role in IOSCO. But the big 
story in Malaysia, the niche where it has had the greatest impact, is Islamic finance.
Islamic finance Islamic finance holds about a 1 per cent share of the global market. 
However, that represents an industry worth up to US$1.3 trillion and growing nearly 20 
per cent annually, sukuk, bonds, being the driving force. Islamic financial institutions are 
now a global presence, with offices in the major world capitals. Certain characteristics of 
Islamic finance permitted it to weather well the recent global financial crisis (not to men-
tion the Asian crisis of 1998).78
Islamic finance, like Islam itself, is characterized by its diversity, its internal divisions and 
disputation centring around its various schools of thought. Nevertheless, two main streams 
of Islamic finance are usually identified, that of the Middle East (represented by Saudi 
Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, and Dubai), and that of Southeast Asia (primarily Malaysia and 
Indonesia).79 The conventional view, although somewhat controversial, is that the Southeast 
Asian version is more flexible when it comes to Sharia compliance, something Malaysia is 
eager to play down.80
Malaysia has taken the lead in Islamic finance in Southeast Asia, although neighbouring 
Indonesia, with the largest Islamic population in the world, has positioned itself as a con-
tender.81 Malaysia though is still the undisputed leader, having one of the most developed 
Islamic financial systems in the world, as well as the largest trading market in Islamic bonds, 
the sukuk.82 Malaysia dominates the global sukuk market, having issued three-quarters of 
global issuance in 2012 after having issued the world’s first sovereign sukuk in 2002.83 These 
are remarkable achievements for a country of less than 30 million people, 60 per cent of 
whom are Muslim. Neighbouring Indonesia, with the world’s largest Muslim society—80 
per cent of a population of 240 million people—only has 4 per cent of its banking assets in 
Sharia compliance.84
Islamic capital markets are ‘ideally characterized by the absence of interest based transac-
tion, doubtful transactions and stocks of companies dealing in unlawful activities or items’. 
Capital markets are ‘one of the [most] important and growing segments in Islamic Finance’.85 
The future is bright for Malaysia and Islamic finance; projections for financial sector growth 
78 Jon Gorvett, ‘Which Way Forward for Islamic Finance?’ (July 2012) Middle East 35.
79 Gorvett (n 78).
80 Gorvett, (n 78).
81 Kevin Brown, ‘Malaysia: Ahead of the game in local contest’, Financial Times (12 May 2010).
82 ‘Banking on the ummah: Malaysia leads the charge in Islamic finance’, The Economist (5 January 2013).
83 ‘Banking on the ummah’ (n 82).
84 ‘Banking on the ummah’ (n 82).
85 Wan Razazila Wan Abdullah, Jamal Roudaki, and Murray Clark, ‘The Evolution of the Malaysian Islamic 
Capital Market: Towards a Global Hub’, from the AFAANZ Global Conference (2010) <http://www.victoria.
ac.nz/sacl/about/events/past-events2/past-conferences/6ahic/publications/6AHIC-75_FINAL_paper.pdf> 
accessed 4 February 2013, 1, citing SO Alhabshi, ‘Development of Capital Market Under Islamic Principles’, 
Paper presented at the Conference on Managing and Implementing Interest Free Banking/Islamic Financial 
System (1994).
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run at ‘a buoyant pace by 8–11% per annum’, expanding its share of Malaysia’s GDP, ‘from 
2.4 times to 3 times by 2020’.86
Malaysian capital markets and their preeminence in Islamic finance The preeminence of 
Malaysian capital markets in Islamic finance has largely been attributed to ‘state nurturing’.87 
Through state leadership and backing, Islamic finance in Malaysia increased to 22 per cent of 
the country’s banking sector in 2011, up from 6 per cent in 2001.88 Impressive government 
policy making and planning appear in the Financial Sector Blueprint of 2011–2020 and the 
Economic Transformation Programme.89 Malaysia is now beginning to open up its Islamic 
finance sector to large Islamic banking conglomerates, as well as to multi-national, and even 
western, Sharia-compliant, banking institutions.
Currently, the conventional (ie non-Islamic) and Islamic components of capital markets in 
Malaysia function side by side, with similar regulatory schemes for each. Additional sets of 
requirements are layered over the conventional finance infrastructure ‘to ensure the Islamic 
products and services are Sharia-compliant’.90 The Shariah Advisory Council, made up of 
both financial and Sharia experts, makes the call on compliance, centralizing the process 
and obviating the need for institution by institution review processes as exist elsewhere. 
Islamic financial and banking products now dominate the domestic Malaysian market. 
‘Sharia-compliant securities amounted to RM1.16 trillion at the end of 2011, accounting 
for 54.4 per cent of the entire capital market. Of the securities listed on Bursa Malaysia 
Securities, 89 per cent are deemed to be Sharia-compliant. Malaysia is the biggest sukuk 
market in the world, with RM349.0 billion in outstanding ringgit-denominated sukuk as 
at the end of 2011, accounting for approximately two-thirds of global sukuk outstanding.’91
In fact, the conventional and Islamic markets are so linked, and have worked so well in paral-
lel, that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) ‘does not distinguish between conventional 
and Islamic markets with respect to expectations or standards’92 in its assessment methodol-
ogy. The IMF has also found that, although there are ‘some areas where enhancements are 
advisable’, the Securities Commission of Malaysia, ‘as the supervisor of the capital markets, 
has developed a robust supervisory framework that exhibits high levels of implementation of 
the . . . IOSCO Principles . . . in most areas. The regimes governing the regulation of issuers, 
auditors, collective investment schemes, market intermediaries and secondary markets, and 
with respect to enforcement, co-operation and information sharing, are extensive’.93 The 
IMF’s assessment reaffirms the maturity and extensiveness of Malaysia’s Islamic capital mar-
ket at the policy level, concluding that Malaysia is now a leader both in the Islamic financial 
sector and in the global securities market as a whole.
86 PwC, ‘Getting the Picture: Malaysia’s Financial Sector Blueprint, Strengthening our Future 2011–2020’ 
(February 2012) <http://www.pwc.com/en_MY/my/assets/publications/fsb-msia_1march2012.pdf> accessed 
12 September 2013.
87 Gorvett (n 78).
88 Gorvett (n 78).
89 PwC (n 86).
90 International Monetary Fund, ‘Malaysia:  Publication of Financial Sector Assessment Program 
Documentation—Detailed Assessment of Implementation of IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities 
Regulation’ (IMF Country Report No 13/59/, 2013), 15.
91 International Monetary Fund (n 90).
92 International Monetary Fund (n 90).
93 International Monetary Fund (n 90), 6.
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Promoting Islamic finance as its niche has proved to be a brilliant strategy for Malaysia. 
Tapping into a neglected but truly international market has invigorated Malaysia’s domestic 
markets, as well as bringing it recognition as a leader internationally. Malaysia identified the 
factors impeding the growth of Islamic finance such as the lack of standardized products, the 
costly procedures associated with structuring them, the absence of Islamic specific regulatory 
and accounting frameworks. Malaysia then proceeded to draw upon techniques developed 
in the conventional international capital markets to address these problems.
There is an increasingly robust international institutional framework for standard-setting 
which serves to address the problems stemming from lack of standardization. Inspired 
by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), the Accounting and Auditing 
Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) was established in Bahrain by 
Islamic financial institutions in 1991.94 AAOIFI regularly issues accounting, auditing, and 
governance standards for Islamic financial institutions as well as Sharia standards. Thus the 
AAOIFI aims to achieve harmonization and convergence in the concepts and application 
among the Sharia supervisory boards of individual Islamic financial institutions so as to 
avoid contradiction or inconsistency between the fatwas and applications by these institu-
tions.95 Malaysia is a prime proponent of AAOIFI; ‘the universe of Islamic finance contracts 
applied in the Malaysian Islamic finance sector embraces all opinions of the AAOIFI’.96
Another international body, the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), somewhat analo-
gous to IOSCO, is an ‘international standard setting body of regulatory and supervisory 
agencies’97 and its objective is to promote the ‘development of a prudent and transparent 
Islamic financial services industry through introducing new, or adapting existing, interna-
tional standards consistent with Sharia principles’.98 Malaysia established the IFSB, situated 
in Kuala Lumpur, by national legislation, the Islamic Financial Services Board Act 2002. 
The IFSB has nearly 200 members, in 39 jurisdictions,99 including central banks, interna-
tional multilateral institutions such as the IMF, The World Bank and Bank for International 
Settlements, and financial institutions.100
Malaysia was also one of the founding members of the International Islamic Financial 
Market (IIFM), another international Islamic finance standard setter, a ‘standard setting 
organization focused on the Islamic capital and money market segment of the industry’.101 
IIFM, in a manner similar to that of ISDA (the industry association for the international 
swaps and derivatives markets), focuses on standardizing Islamic financial products, docu-
mentation and related processes.
94 Nicholas HD Foster, ‘Islamic Finance Law as an Emergent Legal System’ (2007) 21 Arab Law Quaterly 
170, 179
95 Foster (n 94), 179.
96 Kabir Hassan and Michael Mahlknecht, Islamic Capital Markets: Products and Strategies (Wiley Finance 
Series, 2011), 325.
97 See the IFSB website: <http://www.ifsb.org/background.php> accessed 23 December 2013.
98 See the IFSB website (n 97).
99 Oxford Analytica comment, ‘Islamic Finance Moves Towards Common Standards’, Forbes (9 March 
2010)  <http://www.forbes.com/2010/03/08/islam-finance-sharia-business-oxford-analytica.html> accessed 
23 December 2013.
100 Foster (n 94), 179.
101 See IIFM website <http://www.iifm.net> accessed 23 December 2013.
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Finally, the Shariah Advisory Council (SAC) of Bank Negara Malaysia, the country’s 
central bank, acts as the highest Sharia authority for Islamic finance in Malaysia and is 
responsible for both determining Islamic law for the purposes of Islamic finance and for val-
idating all Islamic finance products to ensure their compatibility with Sharia principles.102 
Indeed, ‘the Shariah standards of the Shariah Advisory Council of Malaysia incorporate 
all the Shariah interpretations of the AAOIFI’.103 Thus, Malaysia’s intimate role in the 
international standard-setting of Islamic finance has been pivotal to its success in becom-
ing the world’s centre for Islamic finance. Other initiatives by the Malaysian government 
have helped the country to carve out this niche. Two institutions set up by Bank Negara 
Malaysia are of particular importance. First, the International Centre for Education in 
Islamic Finance (INCEIF), established in 2005, is the world’s leading university for Islamic 
finance drawing its students from 80 countries. Within the INCEIF is the International 
Sharia Research Academy where scholars formulate an international rule-book for Islamic 
finance.104 Secondly, the Islamic Banking and Finance Institute of Malaysia (IBFIM) assists 
financial institutions in becoming Sharia-compliant through consulting services and certi-
fication in Islamic finance.105
Social and political factors, prompted by economic disparities along ethnic lines, played a 
role in government-led initiatives to establish Islamic finance in Malaysia.106 IOSCO has 
identified other triggers: ‘two main reasons that have been identified to support the emer-
gence of the Malaysian Islamic Capital Market are the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and the 
liquidity problem resulting from surplus funds from the Islamic finance industry’.107 The 
Malaysian government acted to deter future financial upheavals.108 Malaysia began to pay 
close attention to its regulatory framework and its markets. Incentives promoted the devel-
opment of both the Islamic financial sector and the regulators.109 This was state capitalism, 
but one well attuned to the markets and supported by a strong form of common law and 
institutions. Building on conventional finance, tweaking and adapting it to Islamic princi-
ples and the characteristics of the market were fundamental. In particular, Malaysia recog-
nized the international nature of Islamic finance and drew on international experience. And, 
importantly, there was a nascent market; it just needed a little watering.
102 See SAC website <http://www.bnm.gov.my/index.php?ch=7&pg=715&ac=802> accessed 23 
December 2013.
103 Hassan and Mahlknecht (n 96), 325.
104 ‘Banking on the ummah’ (n 82).
105 ‘Banking on the ummah’ (n 82).
106 Wan Abdullah, Roudaki, and Clark (n 85), 27. ‘Initiatives taken by the Malaysian government towards a 
global hub are substantial. Every perspective, such as product innovation, infrastructure facilities, policy incen-
tives, human capital development, liberalisation and regulatory framework are being well focused. All parties 
either the regulatory bodies or the market players are involved to ensure the achievement of an international 
hub for an Islamic Capital Market.’
107 Wan Abdullah, Roudaki, and Clark (n 85), 1.
108 Although strongly criticized at the time of the Asian financial crisis for imposing exchange controls, 
Malaysia’s intervention in the market was subsequently vindicated.
109 ‘[T] he scope of jurisdiction for these regulating bodies encompasses both Islamic and conventional 
finance matters. Malaysia’s banking and insurance sectors come under the jurisdiction of the Central Bank, 
Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) while the capital market is regulated by the Securities Commission Malaysia 
(SC). Matters related to offshore finance industry are regulated by the Labuan Offshore Financial Services 
Authority (LOFSA)’: Wan Abdullah, Roudaki, and Clark (n 85), 2
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3.2.2 Singapore
Singapore, the Lion City, fits the niche market profile in terms of size, geographic location 
(a hinterland rich in opportunity), openness to trade and commerce, richness of human 
resources, and ease of implementing government-led market and regulatory initiatives. 
For Singapore, the problem has been finding the niche. Granted, Singapore is Asia’s largest 
overseas market for Asian equity futures (focusing on China, India, and Japan). With the 
advent of real estate investment trusts (REITs) in 2002 and business trust structures in 2004, 
the Singapore exchange, SGX, has also established itself as the Asia-Pacific region’s largest 
exchange for REITs.110 But Malaysia has outmanoeuvered Singapore by commandeering 
Islamic finance. And despite the recent appearance in Singapore of Rmb-denominated ‘lion 
bonds’111 and ‘S-chips’,112 Hong Kong has secured its own position as the gateway to China.
Looking to London, Singapore sees itself as a primarily international trading venue with a 
focus on foreign listings. Already, 40 per cent of the approximately 800 listed companies in 
Singapore are non-domestic, more than half of which are from outside China. However, 
this may disguise a more fundamental problem with the market. Singaporeans themselves 
are not particularly interested in equity investing; they prefer to punt on property. In look-
ing for growth, Singapore has targeted the regional Asian markets with the ambition of 
becoming the ‘gateway to Asia’ (ex-China and ex-Japan) for Europe. However, other Asian 
markets, in countries like Indonesia or Vietnam, are becoming feisty in their own right. And 
Singapore recently suffered an embarassing setback in a growth by acquisition strategy, when 
the Ausralian government scuppered a friendly merger with the ASX in Sydney.
Singapore has many niche market advantages nevertheless:  its strategic geographic posi-
tion between Asia and Europe (coupled with an orchid-filled airport); a strong tradition 
of common law and English-style financial institutions; an English educated, majority 
Mandarin-speaking population; a plethora of financial and legal advisers; tax incentives for 
both individuals and businesses; a political system which can respond quickly and directly to 
change; and an intolerance for corruption.
Increasingly, Singapore has become a playground for the rich, the Switzerland of Asia.113 Let 
Hong Kong handle the massive flotations for the Chinese state-owned enterprises; when it 
comes time to stash away the profits, Singapore is eager and waiting. Singapore strives to be 
a hub; economic, legal, scientific, artistic. It is a player and, consequently, for anyone look-
ing to do business in Asia, Singapore is a serious contender. With a top tax bracket of 15 per 
cent, the wealth managers have poured in together with the wealthy, the hedge funds and 
the multinationals. Singapore therefore strives to remain as stable, low-cost and efficient as 
possible.114
110 Shirlene Tsui, ‘SGX—A prescription for growth’, Wall Street Journal (New York, 14 March 2011) <http://
blogs.wsj.com/exchange/2011/03/14/sgx-a-prescription-for-growth/> accessed 12 September 2013.
111 Bonds denominated in renminbi, mainland Chinese currency.
112 S-chips are mainland Chinese companies with securities listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange (SGX). 
The problem with S-chip companies has been their inferior quality, leading to delisting or being placed on a 
watch list by the SGX.
113 The attractions are secure property rights, political stability, independence, and centrality in ASEAN, the 
region set to become the world’s largest economic region.
114 However, fostering a dual economy always runs the risk of local backlash against the expatriate com-
munity. In 2012, the Straits Times, Singapore’s main newspaper, ran a few articles questioning the need for so 
many expatriates, lamenting the lack of high paying and quality jobs for Singaporeans and the increasing cost 
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Development of Singapore’s capital market The story of capital markets regulation 
in Singapore begins in1973 with the passage of the Securities Industry Act115 which cre-
ated the Stock Exchange of Singapore (SES, a predecessor to the current SGX) and the 
Securities Industry Council (SIC). In the English tradition, at that time, the SES was largely 
self-regulatory.116
In 1985, the ‘Pan-El Crisis’ profoundly shook both the Singaporean and Malaysian markets. 
Pan-Electric was a Singapore-listed company with 71 subsidiaries and a market capitaliza-
tion of approximately $200 million. When Pan-Electric unexpectedly went into receivership 
both the Singapore and Malaysian stock markets had to shut down. Singapore responded 
with a new Securities Industry Act in 1986 and progressively adjusted its financial regulatory 
framework in the period leading up to the Asian financial crisis of 1997.117 The calibration 
continued apace as the Asian financial crisis subsided, culminating in the current Securities 
and Futures Act of 2002 (the SFA).118
The regulatory framework and institutions in Singapore demonstrate a strong British 
imprint, of the older variety. The central bank, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), 
has ultimate oversight of financial markets while the exchange, the SGX, does the heavy lift-
ing, operating as a self-regulatory organization.
Under the present regulatory scheme, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (‘MAS’) super-
vises the securities industry.119 It has less oversight of an exchange’s disciplinary procedures 
and rule changes. The day to day supervision of the market is still left with the SGX. The 
internal management of the SGX is regulated by its Memorandum and Articles of Association. 
Trading in securities is regulated by the SGX Rules. The criteria for listing and the obligations 
of listed companies are found in the SGX Listing Manual.120
MAS is a powerful, centralized regulator,121 specifically charged with maintaining Singapore 
as a sound and reputable financial centre. A separate, and equally important, mandate is 
to promote Signapore as an international financial centre.122 In addition to administering 
financial legislation and creating a supporting regulatory framework, MAS has a number of 
other instruments in its regulatory arsenal, both coercive and persuasive. Directions, which 
‘detail specific instructions to financial institutions or other specified persons to ensure 
of living. Additionally, there was a public outcry when a mainland Chinese ran his Ferrari through a taxi, killing 
all involved.
115 Securities Industry Act 1973 (No 17 of 1973).
116 Walter Woon, ‘Regulation of the Securities Industry in Singapore’ (1994) 4 Pacific Rim Law and Policy 
Journal 731.
117 Professor Hans Tjio and Rachel Eng, Corporate Finance and Securities Regulation (Singapore Academy 
of Law Ed, 2012), para 17.1.2.
118 Securities and Futures Act 2002 (Ch 289) (2002).
119 Within the MAS, the Financial Supervision Department looks after capital markets regulation as one 
of its three units, the two others being Banking and Insurance and Policy, Risk and Surveillance. The Capital 
Markets unit handles enforcement, markets and infrastructure supervision as well as policy matters. The Policy, 
Risk and Surveillance unit conducts economic surveillance and develops ‘prudential policy’. MAS thus operates 
as an integrated financial services regulator. Monetary Authority Singapore, ‘Monetary Authority Singapore 
Organizational Chart’ (2013), <http://www.mas.gov.sg/about-mas/overview-of-mas/organisation-chart.aspx> 
accessed 12 September 2013.
120 Tijo and Eng (n 117), para 17.1.2.
121 Monetary Authority of Singapore Act (Ch 186) (1999).
122 Monetary Authority of Singapore Act (Ch 186) (1999), s 4(2)(d).
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compliance’, permit MAS to attach criminal sanctions. MAS also sets out ‘principles or “best 
practice standards” that govern the conduct of specified institutions or persons’ which do not 
create civil or criminal liability but which assist MAS in its risk assessments. Very much in 
keeping with English tradition, Singapore also makes use of ‘voluntary codes’, the Takeover 
Code,123 a Code on Collective Investment Schemes,124 and a Code of Conduct for Credit 
Rating Agencies.125 Because they are non-statutory, these codes rely on reputational forces 
for their traction.126 A breach of a code obligation may result in a private tap on the wrist by 
MAS or public naming and shaming. In addition, there are also an assortment of practice 
notes, circulars and policy statements, none with coercive effect, but useful for informational 
purposes given the cryptic nature of the legislative instruments. Again, in the English tradi-
tion, the Securities Industry Council (SIC), first created in 1973 and composed of bankers, 
legal experts, MAS staff and other industry experts, advises the Minister for Finance. In addi-
tion, the SIC administers the Takeovers Code.
The Singapore Exchange (SGX) Singapore is best known in world capital markets for its 
exchange. The Singapore Exchange (SGX) was established in December 1999 as an invest-
ment holding company after consolidating former exchange companies, namely the Stock 
Exchange of Singapore, the Singapore International Monetary Exchange and Securities 
Clearing and Computer Services. SGX offers securities, fixed income, derivatives, and com-
modities products as well as a suite of services including clearance, settlement and deposi-
tory, and over-the-counter clearing for oil swaps and forward freight agreements. These are 
supported by a robust technical infrastructure for market data and access.
As in London prior to the creation of the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in 2000, the 
stock exchange is a front line regulator in Singapore, albeit under the watchful eye of the 
MAS. As with other modern, demutualized exchanges, SGX is a company limited by shares 
and has adopted a variety of regulatory approaches,127 combining the disclosure based regu-
lation of the United States with the risk based targeting pioneered by the FSA in London. 
With its ambitions to be an international trading venue, the SGX pays attention to interna-
tional standards and best practices, but always tailored to idiosyncratic Singaporean ways.
Exchanges worldwide are an endangered species, looking for new ways to survive; SGX is no 
exception. On 1 May 2013, SGX began a restructuring process.128 The proposed merger of 
the SGX with the ASX in Sydney was another high profile survival strategy, but one which 
met with failure. SGX, in headlong competition with Hong Kong, was looking for growth 
potential. Singapore and Hong Kong—two of the region’s financial hubs—have been trying to 
123 Code on Take-Overs and Mergers (Monetary Authority of Singapore Ed, 2012).
124 Code on Collective Investment Schemes (Monetary Authority of Singapore Ed, 2011).
125 Code of Conduct for Credit Rating Agencies (Monetary Authority of Singapore Ed, 2012).
126 Reputational forces can be quite powerful in a small place.
127 Singapore Exchange, SGX, ‘Regulatory Approach, Philosophy and Guiding Principles’ (2013).
128 Its operations were divided into five business units: Derivatives, Listings, Market Data and Access, 
Post-Trade, and Securities. SGX said in a statement that these units, ‘with the support of the sales and cli-
ent unit, will collectively drive the expansion of the products and services suite, the attraction of more and 
larger listings, the growth of retail and professional participation, and the building of the post-trade business’. 
Jakes Thomases, ‘SGX faces a resignation and a restructuring’, Waters Technology (28 March 2012) <http://
www.waterstechnology.com/sell-side-technology/news/2164385/sgx-resignation-restructuring> accessed 12 
Septermber 2013.
 
9.58
9.59
9.60
Jordan191113OUK.indb   219 4/23/2014   7:13:49 PM
Niche Markets and Their Lessons
220
‘outmaneuver one another in pursuit of new listings and investor cash’.129 The two economies 
are competitive, open, and approximately the same size. And yet, SGX is a fraction of the size 
of its Hong Kong counterpart, raising only one-ninth the amount of capital, offering one-third 
the amount of liquidity and trading less than one-fifth on average per day.130 This competitive 
state of affairs propelled SGX to seek growth via the mergers and acquisitions route.
It is within this context that SGX’s proposed US$8.3 billion cash-and-shares offer for ASX 
was announced in October 2010,131 under the slogan ‘Asia Pacific—the heart of global 
growth’.132 ASX-SGX Ltd, to be listed on both the Australian and Singaporean exchanges, 
would have been the fifth largest exchange group in the world, offering access to 2,700 listed 
companies from 20 countries—including over 900 resource firms and the largest number of 
real estate investment trusts and exchange-trade funds133—and boasting a combined mar-
ket capitalization of US$12.3 billion.134 It would also have been the second-largest in the 
Asia-Pacific region by market value (after Hong Kong) and second in the Asia-Pacific by 
number of listings (after India).135
From the Singaporean perspective, this was a tempting prospect. For numerous reasons, 
SGX and the ASX were widely regarded as highly compatible exchanges for the purposes 
of a merger. Economically, the Asia-Pacific region is growing and there is increasing com-
petition to provide the most liquid portfolio of financial products.136 Both exchanges are 
powered by Nasdaq OMX’s Genium INET trading technology permitting creation of a 
single, multi-asset platform with a single access point in the region, reducing trading costs 
and increasing technical efficiencies.137 Despite these persuasive arguments, the Australian 
Treasurer rejected the merger proposal; SGX and ASX mutually terminated the agreement 
and SGX stated that it would ‘continue to pursue organic as well as other strategic growth 
opportunities, including further dialogue with ASX on other forms of cooperation’.138 
Putting on a brave face, SGX CEO Magnus Bocker said of his merger attempt, ‘it put SGX 
on the map, it made people sit up and take notice of us and it opened many new doors’.139 
Organic growth and strategic cooperation continued to be possibilities.140
129 Chris V Nicholson, ‘Regulators Set to Reject Merger of Singapore and Australia Exchanges’, 
The New  York Times (5 April 2011)  <http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/04/05/australia-says-its-set
-to-reject-sgx-asx-merger/?_r=0> accessed 12 September 2013.
130 Nicholson (n 129).
131 Chris V Nicholson, ‘Australia Rejects Exchange Deal’, The New York Times (8 April 2011) <http://deal-
book.nytimes.com/2011/04/08/australia-rejects-exchange-deal/> accessed 12 September 2013.
132 ‘Exchange Mergers: Back for More’, The Economist (London, 11 February 2011) <http://www.econo-
mist.com/node/18114593> accessed 12 September 2013.
133 Michael Richardson, ‘ASX Deal Could Bring New Foreign Capital Flows’ (10 December 2010) Australian 
Financial Review 67.
134 Robert Laible, ‘ASX/SGX merger presents synergies and hurdles’, The Trade News (27 October 
2010) <http://www.thetradenews.com/newsarticle.aspx?id=5184> accessed 23 December 2013.
135 Bettina Wassener, ‘Singapore Exchange to Buy Australia Counterpart’, The New  York Times (25 
October 2010)  <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/26/business/global/26exchange.html> accessed 12 
September 2013.
136 Robert Laible, ‘ASX/SGX merger presents synergies and hurdles’, The Trade News (27 October 
2010) <http://www.thetradenews.com/newsarticle.aspx?id=5184> accessed 23 December 2013.
137 Robert Laible, ‘ASX/SGX merger presents synergies and hurdles’, The Trade News 27 October 
2010 <http://www.thetradenews.com/newsarticle.aspx?id=5184> accessed 23 December 2013.
138 Nicholson (n 131).
139 R Sivanithy, ‘Failed ASX bid put SGX on the map: Bocker’, The Business Times Singapore (15 March 2012).
140 Kevin Brown ‘SGX chief plays down failed offer’, Financial Times (19 April 2011) <http://www.ft.com/
cms/s/0/10581860-6aa0-11e0-80a1-00144feab49a.html#axzz2eeAmwUYw> accessed 12 September 2013.
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Becoming a global stock exchange Historically, SGX has focused on listing companies in 
the Southeast Asia region. More recently, however, Singapore has begun promoting itself as 
the ‘Asian Gateway’. With Singapore having established itself as a prominent hub for inter-
national trade, the city-state is hoping for similar traction in international finance. SGX’s 
ambitions are to establish itself as a global stock exchange.141
SGX established the ‘S-chip’ market which targets mainland Chinese companies, espe-
cially ones that have been unable to list in Hong Kong due to crowding out by the bigger, 
state-owned Chinese companies. Generally speaking, SGX regards the S-chip market as 
successful.142 However, this success has come at some reputational cost; SGX is known as an 
exchange for sub-par Chinese companies. In 2010, for example, over 20 companies were on 
a watch list or were in the process of being delisted because of poor performance. Eight of 
these companies were from mainland China, of which one was noted for its ‘founders [hav-
ing] fled while owing millions’.143
SGX is also expanding product range into derivatives and currency.144 Noting that 
Singapore is the world’s fourth-largest foreign exchange trading hub, Mr Bocker said that 
the addition of Asian foreign-exchange futures would capitalize on Singapore’s foothold 
in trading in Asian currencies. At the outset, SGX is expected to offer the four currency 
pairs of AUD/USD, AUD/Yen, INR/USD and USD/SGD and the contracts ‘aim to 
make managing currency risk more efficient by allowing investors to rely on some of the 
same collateral posted against trades in derivatives ilnked to key Asian stock indexes’.145 
Derivatives may seem like good news for SGX. In the second quarter of 2013, SGX’s 
derivatives business grew 21 per cent to $45.7 million. Average month-end open interest 
on derivatives also rose 83 per cent to 2.5 million contracts while SGX’s OTC clearing 
service, saw volumes increase by 56 per cent to 88,650 contracts on the back of a 90 per 
cent increase in iron ore swaps. In addition, SGX enjoyed record high volumes for its 
China A50 futures and Japan Nikkei 225 options. These contributed to increases of 9.5 
per cent in total revenue to $162 million and 16.9 per cent in profit to $76 million for 
that quarter.146
Yet, these numbers are markedly lower than those of the pre-global financial crisis era. In 
2008, when SGX’s derivatives business was 30 per cent smaller, SGX reported profits of 
$444.3 million thanks in large part to daily securities trading that was 75 per cent higher 
than it is today. These figures represent a bigger problem in Singaporean capital markets; 
trading volume is falling. Notwithstanding that the Straits Times Index (STI) has rebounded 
strongly after the global financial crisis, trading volumes have not recovered and share turno-
ver velocity—a measure of trading volume relative to the size of the market—in the second 
141 Jeffrey Friedland, ‘Singapore Stock Exchange’s “Asian Gateway” policy attracts listings by foreign 
companies’, Friedland Capital News (15 March 2011) <http://friedlandcapital.wordpress.com/2011/03/15/
singapore-stock-exchange%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%9Casian-gateway%E2%80%9D-policy-attracts-listing
s-by-foreign-companies/> accessed 12 September 2013.
142 Friedland (n 141).
143 Tsui (n 110).
144 Matthew Walter, Katy Burne, and Jacob Bunge, ‘SGX cool on talk of another tilt at ASX’, The 
Australian (14 March 2013)  <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/wall-street-journal/sgx-cool-on-
talk-of-another-tilt-at-asx/story-fnay3vxj-1226596741407> accessed 12 September 2013.
145 Walter, Burne, and Bunge (n 144).
146 Joan Ng, ‘Riding the Bull’, The Edge Singapore (28 January 2013).
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quarter of 2013 was 44 per cent, compared to 72 per cent in 2008.147 Regardless of the 
reasons for this, as one market analyst wrote, ‘while we continue to view the SGX’s solid 
longer-term growth prospects as a regional hub as strong, led by regional derivatives trading 
where it is gaining good momentum, we highlight that the nearer-term fortunes of the stock 
are driven by current securities market volumes’.148
The local market in Singapore is problematic. Unlike Hong Kong, Singaporean investors 
have appeared relatively uninterested in the equity markets; they like real estate. Singapore 
practices state capitalism, and government has taken several steps since 2009 to cool down 
the property sector, increasing stamp duties on property transfers and curtailing the avail-
ability of mortgages.Some analysts have seen decreases in residential property transaction 
volumes by 50 per cent and prices by 7 per cent.149
The SGX has also set out to woo the local retail investor, publishing analysis showing that the 
STI has outperformed property prices over the past decade, with good prospects ahead. On 
this front, ‘to increase trading volumes as well as velocity, [Mr] Bocker has led a concerted 
push into developing the retail market by working more closely with the local remisier com-
munity and stepping up education initiatives’.150 In 2012, SGX launched My Gateway, 
an investment education portal that facilitates Singaporean retail investor access to SGX. 
Through resources such as explanatory videos and notes, the portal informs retail investors 
about the merits of investing in the stock market and educates them on topics ranging from 
the business models and risks of telecoms companies to exchange-traded funds (ETFs). 
Furthermore, SGX has imposed higher standards for companies seeking to list their securi-
ties on the Mainboard, sought regulatory approval to require a larger proportion of initial 
public offerings of shares for the retail market, introduced dual-currency stocks and ETFs, 
and even run a share-investing contest that drew more than 13,000 participants online.151 
And the SGX Academy, which runs professional training courses and seminars, is rapidly 
expanding its outreach.
Growing its domestic market is one strategy for Singapore, but it has not given up on 
looking outwards, despite the Australian bruising. In the aftermath of the failed SGX-ASX 
merger, in mid-2012, SGX and ASX established a new trading link for derivatives. Under 
the arrangement, each exchange sets up a hub in the other’s co-location data centre, allow-
ing customers at one exchange’s co-location center trade directly on the other’s derivatives 
segments.152 ASX is set to connect its Australian Liquidity Centre members directly to 
SGX’s derivatives arm, the only international platform offering Chinese and Indonesian 
futures.153
SGX has been intimately involved in similar cooperation agreements in the Asean region. 
Forecasted to grow at 5 per cent in 2013, the region is comprised of ten countries with a 
147 Ng (n 146).
148 Ng (n 146).
149 Ng (n 146).
150 Ng (n 146).
151 Ng (n 146).
152 Anish Puaar, ‘ASX and SGX forge derivatives trading link’, The Trade News (1 July 2012) <http://www.
thetradenews.com/news/Asset_Classes/Derivatives/ASX_and_SGX_forge_derivatives_trading_link.aspx> 
accessed 12 September 2013.
153 Puaar (n 152).
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cumulative GDP of $2 trillion, a rapidly growing middle class and a high savings rate.154 
SGX is an integral member of Asean Exchanges, which is a collaboration of seven stock 
exchanges from Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand aimed 
at promoting Asean securities as an asset class. In 2012, Asean Exchanges launched Asean 
Link, a platform that facilitates cheaper and quicker access to equities listed on the connected 
exchanges by having brokers in different member countries pick up orders from each other 
via the Link. This is in stark contrast to previously technically complicated and expensive 
direct connections that brokers in the various countries had to establish with each other.155 
Asean Link is similar to a three-way South American link established in 2011 between 
Chile, Peru, and Colombia.156 In order to drum up activity on the Link, shares in Singapore, 
Thailand, and Malaysia are exempt from capital gains taxes if purchased over the Link.157
Despite the hype, a year after the launch of Asean Link, cross-border volumes using the Link 
remained low. Home bias is keeping Asean investors in their local markets with which they 
are familiar and where they are not subject to rapid currency fluctuations.158 The regula-
tory framework for cross-border trading may also be lagging (advertently or inadvertently), 
resulting in a regulatory tangle investors are unwilling to negotiate.159 In a face-saving state-
ment, Asean Exchanges called the Link a ‘long-term initiative’.160 The Link is also targeting 
the low end of the market, the smaller brokers, since large traders already have existing infra-
structure and relationships in place to conduct cross-border equities trading.
In continuous pursuit of outreach, SGX has also established hubs in Chicago and London, 
opened an access point in Frankfurt and tied NYSE Euronext’s global trading network into 
its home market centre.161 This makes SGX the first Asian-based exchange to have hubs in 
both Europe and the United States, which SGX promotes as access to the world’s largest off-
shore market for Asian equity futures.162 Similarly, SGX and Eurex have linked up their data 
centres.163 SGX has also entered into a licensing agreement with MSCI, an index provider, 
to list futures linked to more equity indexes in Asian markets. Also, SGX has entered into an 
agreement with Korea Exchange (KRX) for over-the-counter derivatives clearing services, 
enabling clients to transfer positions between their clearinghouses.164
Singapore is a speck in the Asia Pacific. Despite its vast hinterland, Singapore’s challenge 
is growth; Malaysia and Hong Kong have each established themselves as leaders in niches 
154 Jason Ng, ‘Slow Start for Southeast Asian Stock-Trade Link’, The Wall Street Journal (New York, 20 
March 2013) <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323419104578372130557048370.html> 
accessed 12 September 2013.
155 Ng (n 154).
156 ‘Bursa, SGX in Asean link soon’, New Straits Times (Malaysia, 4 September 2012).
157 Ng (n 154).
158 Ng (n 154).
159 Ng (n 154).
160 Ng (n 154).
161 Tommy Fernandez, ‘Singapore Merges Technology, Operations Units’, Securities Technology Monitor (28 
March 2012)  <http://www.securitiestechnologymonitor.com/news/Singapore-Reorganizes-Operations-30
265-1.html> accessed 23 December 2013.
162 ‘SGX chooses BT for Chicago and London hubs’, FOWeek (1 June 2012) <http://www.fointelligence.
com/Article/3046336/SGX-chooses-BT-for-Chicago-and-London-hubs.html> accessed 23 December 2013.
163 Kenneth Lim, ‘Singapore Exchange, Eurex complete data centre link-up’, The Business Times Singapore 
(13 December 2012) <http://www.businesstimes.com.sg/premium/companies/others/singapore-exchange-eu
rex-complete-data-centre-link-20121213 > accessed 23 December 2013.
164 Walter, Burne, and Bunge (n 144).
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which Singapore might have filled. Although Singapore’s focus is resolutely international 
and its ambitions those of a full-service financial centre, the state of its domestic markets 
is a concern. Additionally, the rise of domestic markets in its much larger, close165 neigh-
bours hems Singapore in. Nevertheless, the dynamism and relentless opportunism of the 
SGX keep Singapore on the map, as does Singapore’s own variety of state capitalism. As in 
Malaysia, in Singapore the government and the markets work unabashedly hand in hand.
3.3 Bahrain and Dubai
Despite their close proximity in the Persian Gulf and membership in the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC), Bahrain and Dubai are very different places. Bahrain, a constitutional mon-
archy, is a small archipelago with its main island166 tethered to Saudi Arabia via a 20km-long 
causeway.167 As an ancient centre of human civilization—7,500 years-old by some esti-
mates168—Bahrain was an important fresh water oasis along age-old trading routes. Despite 
recent desertification, perhaps the millennia of traders help explain Bahrain’s reputation for 
openness towards foreigners and large expatriate population.169
Dubai, meanwhile, is a glittering new city studded with spectacular skyscrapers, only 
made possible through a potent combination of oil wealth and modern technology. Unlike 
Singapore, Dubai is not a city-state but is one of two major cities within the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE). From its oil industry origins, the ambitions of Dubai are to transform itself 
into a major financial hub for the Middle East and Gulf region by diversifying away from oil 
and into financial services.
3.3.1 Bahrain
With little by the way of oil resources in comparison to its neighbors, from early on Bahrain 
looked to different ways of growing its economy. Offshore banking became its vehicle of 
choice. In building an offshore banking industry, Bahrain brought in British bankers and 
British banking; the latter arrived, not by way of formal legislation, but the more practical 
‘rule books’ of the banking business.
As in other places in the Gulf and the Middle East, the legal system in Bahrain is a compli-
cated mix of systems and influences, formal and informal. Bahrain, like similarly situated 
jurisdictions, demonstrates a high tolerance for what might be called ‘applied legal plural-
ism’. Civil code influences (as adapted by and emanating from Egypt and Lebanon, for 
example) operate in the region in a formal way, but tend to be somewhat marginalized. 
Islamic law is pervasive, manifesting itself in multiple guises, to a greater or lesser extent, 
depending on the circumstances. The legal framework for finance, on the other hand, often 
finds its inspiration in the City of London and the English common law for a variety of 
165 Relatively close, this being the vast expanse of the Asia Pacific.
166 A tiny 55km by 18km.
167 And it is soon to be tethered to Qatar by another, longer causeway.
168 The earliest civilization in modern day Bahrain was the Dilmun civilization, which has also been claimed 
by some to be the location of the biblical Garden of Eden, <http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/12/09/ancient_
dilmun_garden_eden_gulf_lost_civilisation/> accessed 23 December 2013.
169 In line with its tolerance and openness, Bahrain also hosts expatriate compounds for foreign workers 
who are employed in a conservative Saudi Arabia but who return home to Bahrain across the causeway for a gin 
and tonic after work.
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political and historical reasons. More recently, with the internationalization of finance, an 
overlay of international financial standards adds concepts drawn from the US regulatory 
system to this already heady mix.
For Bahrain, importing British banking was relatively straightforward; they imported the 
British bankers who knew the rules of the City (and who would bring the rulebooks with 
them).170 Being an offshore financial centre though is a competitive business. Growth and 
diversification are often a part of the adaptive process. In small centres, such as Bahrain, the 
direction of this growth and diversification is usually a matter of macroeconomic policy 
(driven by ultimate concerns of basic survival), and not necessarily commercial or market 
considerations.
Bahrain as a niche market Bahrain’s economy sits as an anomaly among regional econo-
mies heavily reliant upon extractive industries. Its finance industry stands out among its 
regional counterparts as the most mature and developed, providing a conduit to the rest of 
the world for the region’s vast reserve of petrodollars. At the same time, international inves-
tors have for long channelled capital into the Gulf region through Bahrain. Most notable, 
perhaps, is the gateway status that Bahrain has for financial flows to Saudi Arabia, conveni-
ently linked by causeway. Dubai and Doha, though, have begun to encroach on Bahrain’s 
turf,171 although Bahrain continues to be competitive in terms of a lower cost of living. 
Incentives always play a role in niche markets; Bahrain offers low tax rates and attractive 
free-trade agreements.172 In the 2013 Index of Economic Freedom, Bahrain is ranked first in 
the MENA (Middle East North Africa) region and twelfth globally.173
Most importantly, Bahrain has a longstanding reputation as one of the most efficient and 
stable finance industries in the Gulf region.174 Offshore banking is one thing though; capital 
markets are another. Bahrain’s stock exchange lost out to investors seeking quick gains from 
the volatility elsewhere in the region, despite the country’s reputation for efficient regulation 
and a long-term base of investors.175 With two new exchanges, Bahrain is over exchanged. 
170 The capital (and other markets) are still governed by ‘rulebooks’. Decree No 64 of 2006 implemented the 
Central Bank of Bahrain and Financial Institutions Law (CBB Law 2006) and is the umbrella legislation for the 
country’s financial markets. CBB Law 2006 established the Central Bank of Bahrain (CBB) to replace the BMA 
as the country’s monetary authority and financial markets regulator, which includes oversight of banking, insur-
ance, investment business licensees, and other financial services providers. The CBB also regulates Bahrain’s 
licensed exchanges and clearing houses. The CBB Law also included the development of a new set of capital 
markets regulations. In addition, laws and regulations were compiled into a Rulebook, in which distinct vol-
umes cover different areas, such as conventional banking, capital markets, collective investment undertakings, 
and Islamic banking. The regulatory framework for capital markets is comprised of the CBB Law 2006, Volume 
6 of the CBB Rulebook and CBB Capital Markets Regulations (collectively, ‘Capital Markets Regime’). See 
OECD, Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes Peer Reviews: Bahrain in 
2011: Phase 1: Legal and Regulatory Framework (OECD Publishing, August 2011), 12.
171 Simeon Kerr, ‘Bahrain: Hopes pinned on niche role’, Financial Times (12 October 2012).
172 Rob Denman, ‘Bahrain? Bank on it’, Site Selection—The Middle East, June 2013. In Bahrain, incentives 
are not restricted to ‘zones’, but available throughout the country. They include 100% foreign ownership of 
95% of business activities, the freedom to repatriate capital, profits, and dividends, and, very attractively, 0% 
personal and corporate income tax.
173 Bertelsmann Transformation Index, Bahrain Country Report, ‘Organization of the Market and 
Competition’ (2012) <http://www.bti-project.org/laendergutachten/mena/bhr/2012/#economic> accessed 
23 December 2013.
174 Kerr (n 171).
175 Oxford Business Group, The Report: Bahrain 2008, ‘Finding a niche market—building from an estab-
lished base’, 69.
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Regulatory reputation matters, though and the Central Bank of Bahrain (CBB), through 
its capital markets arm, the Capital Markets Supervision Directorate (CMSD), is seen as 
the most efficient regulator in the Gulf region. It is a consolidated regulator (in the UK FSA 
style) and noted for robust policymaking.176 Stability is also supported by a currency pegged 
to the US dollar.177
Contributing close to 25 per cent of Bahrain’s GDP, the finance sector is larger than the 
energy sector.178 Bahain hosts a large expatriate community, but Bahrainis represent over 70 
per cent of employment in the finance industry,179 although only 25 per cent of the overall 
labour force. State ‘nurturing’ is extensive, prompting rapid growth in the finance industry 
in recent years; total assets in the industry were close to 22 times larger than the country’s 
GDP.180 However, the main Bahrain exchange, the BHB, is one of the smallest and least 
liquid in the region, with an average turnover of less than 4 per cent of overall capitaliza-
tion. Lack of liquidity is often fatal to an exchange, yet in this case, long term institutional 
investors like pension funds which do not profit from volatility are cited as the support 
for this market. Stability, it is said, has sustained the BHB internationally. In 2006, while 
other regional markets showed sharp losses, Bahrain’s primary stock exchange continued to 
make small gains. Additionally, the BHB’s relatively lower levels of trading and volatility 
also provide for relatively attractive price-to-earnings (P/E) ratios: the average P/E ratio by 
early 2008 was 15.1, compared with 21.9 for Tadawul in Saudi Arabia and 21.7 for Dubai 
Financial Market.181
Bahrain has also encouraged the development of a regional hub for mutual funds; in 2007 
the CBB refreshed its categories for registration of mutual funds, each with its own set 
of regulatory requirements, insulating smaller investors from the risks larger institutional 
investors could take on. By early 2008, there were almost 2,500 mutual funds registered in 
Bahrain, most foreign-managed,182 with a net asset value of close to $16 billion, representing 
an increase of 73 per cent in the preceding 18 months.183
Situated as it is, Bahrain naturally looks to Islamic finance and the market in sukuk, the 
primary Islamic financial instrument. In 2001, the CBB pioneered its issuance of sukuk and 
later that same year, began to develop a Liquidity Management Centre (LMC) to purchase 
and restructure sukuk into short-term debt. Today, CBB is one of the largest lead manag-
ers for sukuk and sukuk capitalization in 2009 exceeded $100 billion, having seen a sharp 
increase after 2007. Sukuk now dominate the Bahrain debt market with over a 90 per cent 
176 ‘Bahrain: Financial Services Report’, The Economist (22 June 2010).
177 Oxford Business Group, The Report: Bahrain 2008 (n 175), 69.
178 ‘Bahrain: Financial Services Report’ (n 176).
179 Oxford Business Group, The Report: Bahrain 2008,‘First to market—Bahrain’s diversified financial sec-
tor serves as a centre for the region’, 49.
180 Oxford Business Group, The Report: Bahrain 2008 (n 179), 49.
181 Oxford Business Group, The Report: Bahrain 2008 (n 175), 71.
182 Volume 6 of the Rulebook on Capital Markets was aligned with EU Directives regarding retail funds. 
In 2012, the economic crisis coupled with the growing popularity of mutual funds in Bahrain prompted the 
country to introduce a revised framework for collective investment schemes. See Oxford Business Group, The 
Report: Bahrain 2008 (n 179), 50; Oxford Business Group, The Report: Bahrain 2009, ‘Tailor-made: highly 
regulated business environment with numerous incentives’, 207.
183 Oxford Business Group, The Report: Bahrain 2008 (n 175), 72.
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share.184 In 2010, the CBB issued its third international sukuk, valued at $1.25 billion, listed 
on the London Stock Exchange.185
Islamic finance is notoriously resistant to standardization, one of its primary drawbacks as a 
commercial matter. In promoting its position as an Islamic finance centre, Bahrain has made 
itself home to several institutions designed to instill greater standardization into Islamic 
financial products. The AAOIFI, with some 200 members, sets the accounting, auditing, 
governance, ethics, and Sharia interpretation standards for Islamic finance institutions. 
Bahrain was the first country to make compliance with AAOIFI mandatory and other Gulf 
states followed suit. Bahrain also plays host to the IIFM, which sets international standards 
for Islamic capital and money markets and the Islamic International Rating Agency (IIRA), 
which, among other things, carries out Sharia compliance assessments. Finally, the LMC 
continues to inject liquidity into the sukuk market.
In 2011, a new exchange opened in Bahrain, BFX, part of a chain of nine exchanges owned 
by Financial Technologies India; the Bahraini government initially participated in setting up 
BFX. The products traded, overlap with those of the BHB, stocks, sukuk, and other Islamic 
securities, although diversified into derivatives and commodities, the idea being to create 
a ‘multi-asset’ exchange in the region.186 Within the BFX sits an Islamic finance division 
known as Bait Al Bursa, which exclusively offers electronic exchange-traded Islamic financial 
instruments, offering a diversified portfolio and a single venue for all exchange-traded busi-
ness in the Islamic finance sector.187 At least, that was the plan. BFX had a troubled start, 
experiencing serious delays, drastic downsizing and a generalized lack of interest. BFX may 
represent something else entirely though; the exchange as commodity. Given the tie up of 
NYSE and Qatar as well as Dubai and NASDAQ, BFX may have been established to be 
sold to a larger, international group. Certainly in the region, the trend is towards exchange 
consolidation.
It may seem anomalous that such a small place as Bahrain could support not one, not two, 
but three exchanges. In another effort to capture specialized international trading, in January 
2013 Bahrain became home to the Joint Arab Bourse (JAB), expected to begin operations in 
2014.188 JAB will be the first common Arab stock market and a private sector oriented initia-
tive, with a market estimated at $3 trillion. As with exchanges elsewhere, JAB is reaching into 
the lower tiers for business, targeting small and medium-sized enterprises. JAB is as much a 
political statement as a trading venue,189 and its establishment in Bahrain is consistent with 
Bahrain’s efforts to foster the institutions supporting Islamic finance as well as traditional 
market activity which appears difficult to generate.
184 Sat Pal Parashar, ‘Sukuk Industry Development in the Bahrain Capital Market’ in Mohamed Ariff, 
Munawar Iqbal, and Shamsher Mohamad (eds), The Islamic Debt Market for Sukuk Securities: The Theory and 
Practice of Profit Sharing Investment (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012), 157.
185 Pakashar (n 184).
186 Oxford Business Group, The Report: Bahrain 2012, ‘An expanding market: new regulations and the 
introduction of a second Bourse have boosted the kingdom’s appeal’.
187 Abdul Rahman Al Baker, ‘Creating strong foundations for the next phase of development of Islamic 
Investment Markets 2010’, 6th Annual World Islamic Funds and Capital Markets Conference Opening 
Remarks (Bahrain: Manama, 24 May 2010).
188 Maryam Aziz, ‘Forum announces Arab Bourse project’, Nuqudy News (14 January 2013).
189 See Aziz (n 188): The Joint Arab Bourse will offer ‘a safe haven for domestic and regional capital,’ attract 
foreign and migratory capital and harness ‘modern technology to facilitate the flow in investment... bringing 
Arab investment opportunities to [the] attention of the world’s major financial centres’.
 
9.84
9.85
9.86
Jordan191113OUK.indb   227 4/23/2014   7:13:50 PM
Niche Markets and Their Lessons
228
On the formal regulatory side, capital markets activity in Bahrain is overseen by the Capital 
Markets Supervision Directorate (CMSD) within the CBB. The CMSD acts as the listing 
authority for companies and financial instruments on the country’s exchanges. The transi-
tion phase to new regulations for capital markets is still in process; the ‘Rulebook’ is still 
incomplete and only applies to the extent that the relevant sections are available. For exam-
ple, at present, the Capital Markets Volume of the Rulebook does not include a segment on 
Offering Securities, Listing Requirements, and Disclosure Requirements, possibly repre-
senting a lack of demand. As such, these areas of the prior capital markets regulations are still 
applicable, pending completion of the CBB Rulebook.
Reputation is important to Bahrain, so it pays close attention to compliance with interna-
tional standards as a signalling mechanism to the international marketplace. In 2005–06, 
a Financial Sector Assessment (FSAP) was conducted in Bahrain by the IMF and its capital 
markets regulation and supervision assessed against the IOSCO Objectives and Principles of 
Securities Regulation.190 The resulting report acknowledged Bahrain’s generally high stand-
ard for capital markets regulation and supervision, noting that the country was in compli-
ance with most of IOSCO’s core principles.191 This assessment was carried out at a pivotal 
time: numerous regulatory reforms were underway, the CBB Law 2006 was introduced and 
the CBB was being established as the successor to the Bahrain Monetary Authority. Two 
years later, Bahrain became the first national market regulator in the GCC to be accepted as 
an IOSCO member.
As one CBB official put it, ‘it is not a question of whether we are the financial centre in the 
Gulf, it is a question of whether we will continue to be the centre. We have to be vigilant’.192 
So, Bahrain continues to diversify its finance sector, partly in response to competitive threats 
from nearby Dubai and Qatar. It benefits from having a sizeable and experienced finance sec-
tor labour force and an adaptable regulatory attitude towards changing market conditions. 
What began three decades ago as an effort to diversify the Bahraini economy away from its 
reliance upon the energy sector has created a modest, but so far effective, niche market.
3.3.2 Dubai
Dubai has pursued a different strategy from Bahrain for its financial markets. Dubai’s ambi-
tions have gone beyond creating a regional niche market; for Dubai it has been the big 
gesture, cutting a dashing figure on the world stage.193 Coming later to the world of inter-
national finance, Dubai has mirrored some of Bahrain’s attractions,194 but from there Dubai 
has gone its own way, embarking on a novel and ambitious experiment.195 It is not obvious 
the experiment will succeed.
190 International Monetary Fund, Financial System Stability Assessment:  Kingdom of Bahrain (12 
January 2006).
191 IOSCO in 2010 introduced eight new IOSCO principles which the CBB indicated it would integrate 
into its Rulebook.
192 Oxford Business Group, The Report: Bahrain 2008 (n 179), 50.
193 Dubai’s monumental ambitions are made possible by the very deep pockets of its government.
194 Permitting 100% foreign ownership, no taxes on profits or income, a range of double taxation treaties to 
the extent any tax liability is triggered and a showy adherence to international standards.
195 See, generally, Jawad I Ali, ‘Dubai International Financial Centre—entrance to the global economy’ 
(King & Spalding LLP, 20 January 2012).
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Unlike Bahrain, Dubai did not just import British bankers, with their rulebooks tucked 
in their valises. In 2004, Dubai set about dropping a new, improved, City of London into 
the desert, the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC). Like the City of London, the 
DIFC is a small, geographically defined area, 110 acres, within the heart of Dubai City. It 
is recognized as a distinct and independent jurisdiction within Dubai, which is itself one of 
seven emirates, or principalities, which form the UAE. As a federal financial free zone, the 
DIFC has the legislative power to create its own laws, regulations and institutions for all of 
private (civil) and commercial law.196 From the outset, the strategy behind the DIFC was to 
create an international financial centre of world stature, connecting business and financial 
institutions in both emerging and established markets throughout the world.197 The US dol-
lar, the undisputed reserve currency of the world at the time, was adopted as the operating 
currency in the DIFC.
As a legal and regulatory experiment, the DIFC is an interesting case, one that has caught 
the imagination of many. Like Bahrain, the UAE (of which Dubai is a part) demonstrates a 
complex, hybrid, legal system, a mixture of civil, common and Islamic law. Despite the UAE 
now characterizing itself as a predominately civil law jurisdiction, the common law was tra-
ditionally present due to the UAE’s informal colonial ties with Britain. However, after UAE 
independence, the common law was rejected in favour of civil law codes. Unsurprisingly, 
Islamic law—Sharia—also operates within the UAE, enjoying constitutional support. In 
practice, however, Sharia is treated as a subsidiary source of law, to be applied when civil law 
codal provisions and other available sources fail in specificity.198
At its creation in 2004, however, the DIFC adopted the common law, even going so far as to 
import a common law judiciary. So along with the British bankers, in came British judges199 
and a UK-style regulator. But it is not quite so simple (and the common law itself is never 
simple). For example, the capital markets in the DIFC are governed by the Markets Law 
2012 (DIFC Law No 1 of 2012)200 and the Markets Rules (MKT), which are collectively 
196 However, federal criminal laws apply within the DIFC.
197 Ali (n 195). The Dubai version of the creation of the DIFC somewhat ignores the role of Bahrain. Prior 
to the inception of the DIFC, the GCC lacked a regulated financial centre with internationally known and 
accepted standards. Therefore, Federal Decree No 35 of 2004 established the DIFC to correct the regional 
inadequacies and created a financial free zone in Dubai, though one distinguished from other such zones in 
the UAE. The overall framework of the DIFC was designed to attract and ensure continued connectivity with 
global banks and financial institutions. It was designed to centralize regional wealth in an environment designed 
for wholesale banking, capital markets, asset management, reinsurance, Islamic finance, and companies whose 
services are ancillary to these sectors.
198 Nasser Saidi, ‘The Success of the DIFC as an International Financial Centre’, Working Paper (2009), 
<http://nassersaidi.com/2009/09/01/the-successes-of-difc-as-an-international-financial-centre-sept-2009/> 
accessed 16 January 2014.
199 The DIFC Courts were established by Dubai Law No 12 of 2004. They are an independent, 
English-language common law judiciary within the autonomous DIFC exercising jursidiction over national 
and international civil and commercial law. Unless parties have selected otherwise, the Courts’ substantive law 
is developed by the DIFCA and DFSA, with its procedure imported from the rules of the Commercial Court 
in London. They work alongside and in cooperation with the Dubai courts, where the language is Arabic and 
procedure stems from the continental civil tradition. The DIFC Courts’ independence from executive policy 
in Dubai is one of the factors lending credence to its aspirations as a sound financial centre. See Anthony 
Evans, ‘The facts about the DIFC Courts’, Financial Times (11 November 2011) and Ludmila Yamolova, 
‘DIFC Courts: Redefining the judicial process’ (HPL Yamalova and Plewka Legal Consultancy, February 
2010)  <http://www.lyhplaw.com/publications/02-10%20Ludmila%27s%20Article%20re%20DIFC%20
Court.pdf> accessed 16 January 2014.
200 Note the civil law formulation of the legislation.
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referred to as the ‘Markets Regime 2012’. However, Islamic finance also operates within the 
DIFC and must be supported by Islamic law. So there is also the Law Regulating Islamic 
Finance Business 2004 (DIFC Law No 13 of 2004) and the Islamic Finance Rules (IFR), 
known collectively as the Islamic Markets Regime.201
Not surprisingly, the regulator created for the DIFC in 2004 emulated the United Kingdom’s 
FSA, then the leading model.202 The DFSA is a unitary regulator within the DIFC and has 
complete jurisdiction over all the participants in the capital markets, banking and credit ser-
vices, asset management, securities, collective investment funds, custody, trusts and services, 
commodities future trading, Islamic finance, insurance, and exchanges. Moreover, the DFSA 
authorizes, licenses, and registers markets participants operating within the DIFC. Again 
along FSA lines, the now somewhat tarnished risk-based regulatory approach was formally 
adopted.203 A Financial Sector Assessment (FSAP) conducted by the IMF and The World 
Bank in 2007 against the IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation found 
the DFSA to have ‘fully implemented’ 27 out of the 29 principles assessed. The remaining 
two principles, dealing with collective investment schemes, were ‘broadly implemented’.204
The FSAP results merit closer scrutiny. As a point of comparison, the FSAP conducted in the 
United States and published in May 2010 found the SEC/CFTC to have fully implemented 
only 16 out of 29 IOSCO principles, albeit being held to a higher standard. But the DIFC 
ratings must bring into question the utility of the FSAP exercises, when a capital market as 
dysfunctional as Dubai’s rates so highly. The ratings demonstrate a phenonemon present in 
other developing economies, chasing the ratings. Developing economies comply blindly in 
creating regulatory structures which will ‘check the boxes’ in international standards, while 
failing to make real progress towards viable capital markets. The DFSA’s continuous effort to 
meet global standards led to the new Markets Regime 2012,205 which followed a new inter-
national model, the EU Prospectus Directive, as well as picking up more UK refinements 
such as the revised Corporate Governance Code.206
201 The Islamic Markets Regime attaches special rules for Institutions Conducting Islamic Financial Business 
(ICIFB). Such an institution is defined as those ‘carrying on,’ or holds itself out as carrying on, a financial ser-
vice in or from the DIFC as ‘in accordance with Shari’a’. See the Law Regulating Islamic Finance Business 
2004 (DIFC Law No 13 of 2004) s 10. There are two types of institutions that fall within this ambit: Islamic 
Financial Institutions (IFI) and Conventional Financial Institutions (CFI) whereby parts of their dealings are 
with Islamic securities, the so-called ‘Islamic window’ also found elsewhere in the world. It is worth noting that 
the regulator in the DIFC, the Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA), does not hold itself out as a Sharia 
regulator, but rather a Sharia systems regulator. Sharia compliance is not its concern; rather it requires ICIFB to 
implement a system of governance that oversees Sharia compliance.
202 Dubai Law No 9 of 2004 established the DFSA as the single supervisory and regulatory authority of 
the DIFC. DIFC Law No 12 of 2004 (Regulatory Law) provides for the constitution of the DFSA and vests it 
with the necessary rule-making authority. The main responsibilities of the DFSA centre around administering 
the core financial services related laws, which include six laws created over the past decade that are aimed at 
regulating markets, trusts, investments, and Islamic financial business: Oxford Business Group, Bahrain Report 
2008 (n 177).
203 Saidi (n 198).
204 IMF/World Bank, ‘Dubai International Financial Centre:  IOSCO Objectives and Principles of 
Securities Regulation’ (FSAP, IMF Country Report No 07/365, Washington DC, November 2007).
205 The Markets Regime 2012 repealed and replaced Markets Law 2004 the Offered Securities Rule (OSR) 
(Markets Regime 2004). The DFSA proposed the changes in 2011 in order to align itself with leading jurisdic-
tions, while accommodating the capital markets of the GCC region. DFSA, ‘Proposed Changes to the Market 
Law Regime Part 1’, Consultation Paper No 75 (11 April 2011).
206 DFSA, ‘Proposed Changes to the Market Law Regime Part 2—Recognition and Auditing’, Consultation 
Paper No 76 (15 June 2011).
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The DIFC is not the only financial market in Dubai, and neither is the DFSA the only regu-
lator. Outside the geographic confines of the DIFC exists a parallel system. The Government 
of Dubai incorporated the Dubai Financial Market in 2000, operating as one of two local 
stock exchanges within the UAE, the second one being the Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange 
(ADX). The Emirates Securities and Commodities Authority (ESCA) is the regulator for the 
DFM. Again, in keeping up with international fashion, the DFM became a public joint stock 
company in 2006, through an initial public offering of 20 per cent of its shares, the remain-
ing 80 per cent being sold to Borse Dubai (BD) a government-owned holding company.207
Nasdaq, OMX, and Borse Dubai In 2007 the NASDAQ, the US stock market operator 
and Borse Dubai, the government-owned holding company, put an end to a protracted 
battle over their bids for OMX, the Nordic exchange group, by deciding to work together 
in a deal that has had wide-reaching implications for international capital markets. The 
complex agreement involved Borse Dubai advancing its $4 billion cash bid for OMX, 
only to have those shares acquired by NASDAQ in a cash-and-shares transaction that 
left Borse Dubai with approximately 20 per cent of NASDAQ (but with voting rights 
restricted to 5 per cent). Meanwhile, Borse Dubai acquired NADAQ’s 27 per cent stake 
in the London Stock Exchange for $1.6 billion. In addition, NASDAQ became the key 
shareholder in the original DIFX, which became rebranded as NASDAQ Dubai under a 
licencing agreement.208
Having fought over OMX for quite some time, NASDAQ and Borse Dubai realized that 
their interests were compatible. NASDAQ was reportedly interested in using OMX to 
expand into Scandanavia while Dubai was keen on using the technology it would acquire 
to further its interests in emerging markets. The arrangement provided NASDAQ with 
an entry into the Middle East. As for Dubai, though it had successfully developed into a 
Middle Eastern financial hub, the DIFX had found it difficult to attract listings and a tie-up 
with NASDAQ in the United States offered increased possibilities.209 Other Gulf states—
including Qatar and Saudi Arabia—had also sought financial hub status; the NASDAQ 
connection was perceived to be valuable in this regard. The NASDAQ-OMX-Borse Dubai 
arrangement sat against a backdrop of the Dubai government’s decision to combine DIFX 
and its more successful domestic counterpart, the Dubai Financial Market (DFM), under 
Borse Dubai. This was intended to offer investors a single platform across which to trade 
a diverse set of asset classes.210 The arrangement that led to the newly branded NASDAQ 
Dubai was hoped to further this effort to compete by consolidating trading technology and 
providing a platform to further diversification of asset classes.211
Nasdaq Dubai today The 2008–09 global financial crisis added to Dubai’s teething 
problems, leading to a protracted period of depressed values and generally poor exchange 
performance. Then, in 2009, Dubai faced an unprecedented crisis when Dubai World, a 
state-owned enterprise, decided it would not make repayments to its creditors of $26 billion 
of debt. Having opened up its housing market to foreign ownership in 2002, Dubai saw 20 
207 Oxford Business Group, The Report: Dubai 2007, 76
208 Stanley Reed, ‘Nasdaq, Dubai, OMX in Global Tieup’, Bloomberg Businessweek (20 September 2007).
209 Reed (n 208).
210 Babu Das Augustine, ‘Nasdaq DIFX will play key role in Mideast’, Gulf News (21 November 2007).
211 Augustine (n 210).
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to 30 per cent annual growth in some areas between 2006–08. The bubble finally burst in 
2009.212 In 2011, Dubai’s stock indices dropped due to poor performance in the construc-
tion and real estate sectors, as well as uncertainty stemming from the banking sector and the 
so-called Arab Spring, not to mention the Eurozone debt crisis which was in full swing at 
the time.213
Today, the prospects for Dubai’s status as a financial hub are less clear than ever, and cham-
pions on both sides have ample evidence to cite. NASDAQ Dubai has only seven listed 
companies and 12 Islamic bonds. In 2012 and in the first half of 2013 there was a dramatic 
turnaround in Dubai’s stock markets, making them some of the best performers in the 
world.214 Also, after failing to secure emerging-market status from Morgan Stanley Capital 
International (MSCI) for four consecutive years, the UAE finally achieved this status in May 
2013. This is expected to attract portfolio investments from an increasing number of global 
asset managers.215
Earlier in 2013, a few relatively small companies launched their plans for initial public offer-
ings on NASDAQ Dubai. These are the first initial public offerings on the exchange since 
2008, suggesting that the effects of the global financial crisis and Dubai’s 2009 real estate 
crisis may be fading. Certainly, real estate prices have recovered strongly and Dubai’s main 
stock index has risen 74 per cent in one year. Although it is still 55 per cent below its peak 
in 2008, Dubai looks ready to absorb new supplies of equity.216 Yet both of Dubai’s stock 
exchanges—the DFM and NASDAQ Dubai—need much more liquidity and this will not 
be easily addressed by small initial public offerings and trading will be low given their size. 
Much larger listings, perhaps including those of Dubai’s large state-backed companies, are 
necessary if Dubai’s capital markets are to get any real boost.217 At present, a handful of large 
stocks comprise the majority of trading. Meanwhile, the DFM is represented largely by 
financial institutions which comprise more than two-thirds of the market and though it has 
enjoyed healthy liquidity levels over the past year, volatility and uncertainty remain.218 This is 
partly because Dubai’s success is very much dependent upon only two sectors—finance and 
property—and such concentration of risk discourages financial flows.
The largest recent listing to be announced is that of The Bank of London and The Middle 
East (BLME), the UK’s largest Islamic bank, which has indicated that it will list $503 mil-
lion worth of shares on NASDAQ Dubai in its hopes of encouraging Dubai’s prospects 
as a centre for Islamic finance. It is estimated that Dubai’s Islamic finance sector will have 
assets of up to $2 trillion by 2015.219 Whether or not Dubai is able to attract more such list-
ings—and larger ones—will determine its viability as an international financial hub. Dubai 
hosts a unique infrastructure in the form of the DIFC’s internationally recognized legal and 
regulatory framework, a business environment which includes a wide variety of financial 
212 Lindo Xulu, ‘Dubai Financial Market: a fresh look east’, Financial Mail (1 March 2013).
213 Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘UAE: Financial Services Report’ (26 July 2013).
214 Economist Intelligence Unit (n 213).
215 Economist Intelligence Unit (n 213).
216 ‘Dubai IPOs signal recovery but market wants bigger listings’, Asharq Al-Awsat (3 October 2013).
217 ‘Dubai IPOs signal recovery but market wants bigger listings’ (n 216).
218 Xulu (n 212).
219 Simeon Kerr, ‘UK Islamic bank plans Dubai’s first IPO in five years’, Financial Times (16 September 2013).
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services companies, and world-class infrastructure.220 The question is whether, if you build 
it, will they come?
The DIFC is less than ten years old, but its history has been marked by constant change and 
repositioning in terms of finding its footing. Its international exchange, NASDAQ Dubai 
(the former DIFX), has gone through numerous restructurings and is largely considered a 
failure. With its deliberate exposure to international capital markets, the DIFC was also buf-
feted by the global financial crisis, bubbles and near collapses, all perhaps constituting a rite 
of passage along the way to its status as player in the international financial world. Yet the 
Dubai government definitely appears to be in the stock exchange business, with its majority 
state owned enterprise, Borse Dubai, holding 79.63 per cent stake in DFM, 33.3 per cent of 
NASDAQ Dubai, 20.64 per cent of the London Stock Exchange Group, and 16 per cent in 
the NASDAQ OMX Group itself.221 Like a trophy wife, NASDAQ Dubai may be for show, 
with the real business taking place elsewhere.
4. Conclusion
It is a hard business being a niche market, operating in a competitive and often unforgiving 
environment, engaging in constant repositioning and facing inherent limitations on growth. 
Surprisingly, perhaps, there are lots of niche markets and a very diverse grouping they are, 
deploying a variety of survival strategies. In all cases, state capitalism, in various guises, sup-
ports these markets. In earlier times, reputation, a friendly regulator, and good business prac-
tices might have sufficed. Now, there is a new dynamic. The rise of large, new, Asian markets 
bent on establishing themselves in their own right, is eroding opportunities in the hinterland 
for jurisdictions like Singapore. Flash may be dethroning quiet discretion in establishing 
reputation; in theory, Dubai has one of the very best capital markets regulatory frameworks 
anywhere, as measured against international standards, and trumpets this fact to the world. 
As elsewhere, but more so in niche markets, technology is the gamechanger; small as well 
as large markets can be at the cutting edge. Technology is also providing the means for the 
creation of large interconnected networks of markets, which may continue to appear distinct 
on the surface, but which are deeply intertwined through integration of trading platforms as 
well as formal and informal alliances.
220 ‘What does the future hold for Dubai’s global hub status?’, Albawaba Business (18 September 2013).
221 Oxford Business Group, The Report: Dubai 2013, 70.
 
9.103
9.104
Jordan191113OUK.indb   233 4/23/2014   7:13:52 PM
